University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law
Kristina Daugirdas
University of Michigan Law School, kdaugir@umich.edu

Julian Davis Mortenson
University of Michigan Law School, jdmorten@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1904

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace
Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
Recommended Citation
Daugirdas, Kristina, co-editor. "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law." J. D. Mortenson, co-editor.
Am. J. Int'l L. 111, no. 3 (2017): 751-91.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Copyright © 2017 by The American Society of International Law

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS, AND JULIAN DAVIS MORTENSON
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Trump Administration Takes Steps to Implement Bilateral Agreement with Australia Regarding
Refugees
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.46
Shortly after President Trump was elected in November 2016, Australia and the United
States ﬁnalized a bilateral agreement pursuant to which the United States committed to
accepting refugees from Australian-backed immigration detention camps located in Nauru
and Papua New Guinea. While Trump criticized the deal after his inauguration, his administration has nevertheless taken steps to implement it.
In 2013, Australia adopted a “border blockade” policy, known as Operation Sovereign
Borders.1 A military directive enacted with the expressed aim of “combating people smuggling,” Operation Sovereign Borders prohibits any unauthorized maritime arrivals on
Australia’s shores, including refugees.2 To implement this policy, Australia made arrangements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea (PNG). Both countries agreed to operate detention centers on their territories to hold all asylum-seekers who either arrived at Australia’s
shores or were detained by Australia while at sea.3 Australia administers the detention centers
and pays the full costs of their operation.4 According to press reports, Australian government
ﬁgures from May 2016 listed 466 people in the Nauru camp and 847 on Manus Island, most
from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and Sri Lanka.5
Australia’s border blockade has been criticized both inside and outside the Australian
government. The Australian parliament’s Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Committee cited “deeply concerning” reports of “a deeply troubled asylum seeker and refugee
population, and an unsafe living environment—especially for children” in demanding that
“the major faults which mar the current manifestation of the policy of offshore processing
must be acknowledged and rectiﬁed.”6 Documents leaked from Australia’s detention camp
on Nauru revealed that more than 2,000 reported incidents of assault, sexual abuse, child
abuse, and abysmal living conditions took place there.7 Australia’s practice of detaining asylum seekers offshore came under further legal pressure last year when the Papua New Guinea
Supreme Court held that the refugee settlement on Manus Island violated fundamental rights
1

Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Control, Operation Sovereign Borders, at
http://www.osb.border.gov.au.
2
Id.
3
Elibritt Karlsen, Parliament of Australia, Australia’s Offshore Processing of Asylum Seekers in Nauru and PNG: A
Quick Guide to Statistics and Resources (December 2016), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/
Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/Offshore#_Total_number_of.
4
In 2016, Australia spent over $1.1 billion on its offshore detention facilities. See id.
5
Robb M. Stewart, Australia Strikes Deal to Resettle Refugees in U.S. U.S. to Vet Refugees; Most Are from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Sri Lanka, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2016).
6
Parliament of Australia, Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee—Serious Allegations of Abuse,
Self-Harm and Neglect of Asylum Seekers in Relation to the Nauru Regional Processing Centre, and Any Like
Allegations in Relation to the Manus Regional Processing Centre Report, at vi (Apr. 2017), available at http://par
linfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22publications%2Ftabledpapers%2F8
a71c329-c6de-4ca0-82f4-de5a61931e67%22.
7
Paul Farrell, Nick Evershed & Helen Davidson, The Nauru Files: Cache of 2,000 Leaked Reports Reveal Scale of
Abuse of Children in Australian Offshore Detention, GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2016), at https://www.theguardian.com/
australia-news/2016/aug/10/the-nauru-ﬁles-2000-leaked-reports-reveal-scale-of-abuse-of-children-in-australianoffshore-detention.
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guaranteed by the PNG constitution and therefore ordered the PNG and Australian governments to present a plan for resettlement.8
On November 13, 2016, the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, together with
the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, announced that Australia had reached
an agreement
with the United States and it will not under any circumstance be available to any future illegal
maritime arrivals (IMAs) to Australia.
The priority under this arrangement will be for resettlement of those who are most vulnerable,
namely women, children and families.
US authorities will conduct their own assessment of refugees and decide which people are resettled
in the US.
Refugees will need to satisfy standard requirements for admission into the US, including passing
health and security checks.
This process will take time and the resettlement will be gradual.
This arrangement is supported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and we
will continue to engage with UNHCR on its implementation.
We will continue to support the Governments of Nauru and Papua New Guinea to return people
determined not to be owed protection. These people should return to their country of origin.
...
Settlement in Australia will never be an option for those found to [be] refugees in regional processing centres nor for anyone who attempts to travel to Australia illegally by boat in the future.
Australia’s border protection policy remains consistent and ﬁrm. Operation Sovereign Borders
will continue to turnback people smuggling ventures where it is safe to do so and any illegal maritime arrivals to Australia will be sent to regional processing centres.9

Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry brieﬂy addressed the agreement earlier in the day in
response to a question from a reporter. Kerry said:
[O]bviously this has been a great concern of people everywhere because we have more refugees
today than we’ve ever had since World War II. And it’s a pressing, pressing issue.
We in the United States have agreed to consider referrals from UNHCR on refugees now residing
in Nauru and in Papua New Guinea. And we know that these refugees are of special interest to
UNHCR and we’re very engaged with them on a humanitarian basis there and in other parts of the
world.10
UNHCR issued a press release endorsing the agreement:
The approach taken by Australia in transferring refugees and asylum-seekers to open-ended detention in Papua New Guinea and Nauru has caused immense harm to vulnerable people who have
sought asylum since 2013. In this context, UNHCR welcomes the announcement today that refugees currently held in Nauru and Papua New Guinea will be relocated under a bilateral
8

Namah v Pato [2016] PGSC 13; SC1497 (Papau N.G.).
Prime Minister of Australia Malcolm Turnbull Press Release, Refugee Resettlement from Regional Processing
Centres (Nov. 13, 2016), at https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-11-13/refugee-resettlement-regional-process
ing-centres.
10
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry (Nov. 13, 2016), at https://20092017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/11/264266.htm.
9
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arrangement between Australia and the United States.
The arrangement reﬂects a much-needed, long-term solution for some refugees who have been
held in Nauru and Papua New Guinea for over three years and who remain in a precarious situation. It is on this basis that UNHCR will endorse referrals made from Australia to the United
States, on a one-off, good ofﬁces, humanitarian basis, in light of the acute humanitarian situation.
. . .11

Further details of the agreement are unavailable because the agreement remains classiﬁed.12
Among other things, the Australian government declined to say whether Australia had promised the United States anything in exchange.13 At an early stage of the negotiations, Prime
Minister Turnbull had indicated that Australia would accept refugees who are being held in
Costa Rica during the assessment of their U.S. asylum claims.14 More recently, Ann Richard,
who was the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration at the
time the agreement was negotiated, explained in an interview:
When the Australians ﬁrst came to us my motivation was let’s do this, let’s make this happen, we
have got to get these individuals to a better place.
I have never been to either of these locations but my understanding is that the people there are
really suffering and they are suffering in part because their situation is so open-ended.
They don’t know what is going to become of them and they don’t know where they are going to
live out the rest of their lives so I thought we should really make this happen. Others at the State
Department then got involved and said, “Well, what kind of things can we discuss with the
Australians in order to affect an arrangement where everybody does a little extra from their
country.”15

Richard explained that Australia would be expected to increase its intake of refugees from
Africa, a troubled region hosting more than a quarter of the world’s refugees, and to do
more to reunite families torn apart during the refugee journey.16
Shortly after his inauguration, President Donald Trump expressed serious reservations
about the agreement. President Trump spoke with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm

UNHCR Press Release, UNHCR to Endorse the Australia-United States Relocations as “Offshore Processing”
Arrangements Fail Refugees (Nov. 13, 2016), at http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2016/11/58290a5b4/
unhcr-to-endorse-australia-united-states-relocations-as-offshore-processing.html.
12
Helen Davidson, Senior US Republicans Criticize ‘Secret’ Refugee Deal with Australia, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25,
2016), at https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/nov/25/us-republicans-secret-refugee-deal-austra
lia; Zoe Daniel & Stephanie March, US Refugee Deal: Architect of Deal Says Arrangement Loosely Based on
Australia ‘Doing More,’ ABC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2017), at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-22/us-refugeedeal-architect-says-based-on-australia-doing-more/8375250.
13
Stewart, supra note 5. In September 2016, at then-President Obama’s global migration summit, Australia
announced it would resettle migrants from U.S.-backed detention camps in exchange for the United States taking
refugees in Australia’s island detention centers. Tara Jon, U.S. and Australia Might Be Close to a Deal on Refugee
Swap, TIME (Nov. 11, 2016), at http://time.com/4567890/australia-refugee-deal-obama-nauru.
14
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Speech at President Obama’s Leaders’ Summit on Refugees (Sept. 21,
2016), at https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/speech-at-president-obamas-leaders-summit-on-refugees;
see also Dep’t of Homeland Security Press Release, U.S. Expands Initiatives to Address Central American
Migration Challenges (July 26, 2016), at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/07/26/us-expands-initiativesaddress-central-american-migration-challenges.
15
Daniel & March, supra note 12.
16
Id.
11
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Turnbull by telephone on January 28, 2017.17 According to press reports, the conversation
became heated when discussing the refugee agreement, and Trump abruptly ended the call.18
A few days later, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer said:
So the deal speciﬁcally deals with 1,250 people. They’re mostly in Papua New Guinea, being held.
Those people—part of the deal is that they have to be vetted in the same manner that we’re doing
now. There will be extreme vetting applied to all of them. That is part and parcel of the deal that
was made. And it was made by the Obama administration with the full backing of the United
States government.
The President, in accordance with that deal to honor what had been agreed upon by the United
States government, and in ensuring that that vetting will take place in the same manner that we’re
doing it now, will go forward.19

Then on February 1, 2017, President Trump tweeted: “Do you believe this? The Obama
Administration agreed to take thousands of illegal immigrants from Australia. Why? I will
study this dumb deal!”20 White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer subsequently addressed
the agreement again, saying:
We have a tremendous amount of respect for the people of Australia, for Prime Minister Turnbull,
and it was a follow-up on the call. But we’re going to continue to work through this. We’re going
to honor the commitments that we’ve made in some way, meaning that we are going to vet these
people in accordance with the agreement that happened. And we’ll continue to have further
updates as we do.21

In early April, ofﬁcials from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security reportedly spent
several days on Manus Island, distributing information about resettlement, interviewing refugees, and collecting ﬁngerprints and photographs.22 After meeting with Prime Minister
Turnbull on April 24, Vice President Mike Pence spoke about the agreement, conﬁrming
that the United States would implement the agreement, notwithstanding the Trump administration’s doubts about its wisdom:
Let me make it clear the United States intends to honor the agreement, subject to the results of the
vetting processes that now apply to all refugees considered for admission to the United States of
America. President Trump has made it clear that we’ll honor the agreement. It doesn’t mean we
admire the agreement. Frankly, looking back on the last administration, the President has never
been shy about expressing frustration with other international agreements, most notably the socalled nuclear agreement with Iran. But rest assured, as I conﬁrmed today with the Prime
17
White House Press Release, Readout of the President’s Call with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull (Jan. 28, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/01/28/readout-presidents-callaustralian-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull.
18
Greg Miller & Philip Rucker, ‘This Was the Worst Call by Far’: Trump Badgered, Bragged and Abruptly Ended
Phone Call with Australian Leader, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/no-gday-mate-on-call-with-australian-pm-trump-badgers-and-brags/2017/02/01/88a3bfb0e8bf-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html.
19
White House Press Release, Press Brieﬁng by Press Secretary Sean Spicer (Jan. 31, 2017), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/01/31/statement-press-secretary-sean-spicer.
20
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 1, 2017), at https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/827002559122567168.
21
White House Press Release, Press Brieﬁng by Press Secretary Sean Spicer (Feb. 2, 2017), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/02/03/press-brieﬁng-press-secretary-sean-spicer-232017-8.
22
Zoe Daniel & Stephanie Anderson, US Ofﬁcials Fingerprint Refugees on Manus Island as Part of US-Australia
Resettlement Deal, ABC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2017), at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-05/us-ofﬁcials-ﬁnger
printing-refugees-on-manus-island/8416574.
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Minister, the United States of America will honor the agreement. And actually we’ve initiated the
process of fulﬁlling that agreement, subject to the results of the vetting processes that now apply to
all refugees in the United States.23

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Trump Administration Criticizes NATO Members for Failing to Meet Defense Spending
Guideline; United States Joins Other NATO Members in Supporting Montenegro’s
Membership in the Organization
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.47
Throughout Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and into the ﬁrst months of his presidency, he has warned that the United States’ commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) may depend on whether its partner states increase their defense spending in line with previously adopted guidelines. While senior administration ofﬁcials have reafﬁrmed U.S. commitments to the NATO alliance, including the North Atlantic Treaty’s
mutual defense obligation on several occasions,1 President Trump himself did not so until
mid-June. Separately, the Trump administration signaled its support for NATO by supporting the admission of Montenegro as a new member state.
The North Atlantic Treaty does not impose a quantitative requirement for defense spending. Article 3 provides:
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly,
by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.2

This treaty obligation has been supplemented by various subsequent agreements. In 2006,
NATO member states made a political commitment to spending at least 2 percent of their
gross domestic product (GDP) on defense.3 In 2014, the heads of state present at the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Wales reiterated and expanded upon this commitment. An
excerpt follows:
Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. . . . Allies whose current proportion of
GDP spent on defence is below this level will: halt any decline in defence expenditure; aim to
increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows; aim to move towards the 2% guideline
within a decade [i.e., by 2024] with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and ﬁlling
NATO’s capability shortfalls.4
23
White House Press Release, Remarks by the Vice President and Australian Prime Minister Turnbull at a Press
Conference (Apr. 22, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/04/24/remarks-vice-presi
dent-and-australian-prime-minister-turnbull-press.
1
The North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 UNTS 243.
2
Id. Art. 3.
3
North Atlantic Treaty Org., Funding NATO (last updated June 2, 2017), at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_67655.htm.
4
North Atlantic Treaty Org., Wales Summit Declaration, para. 14 (Sept. 5, 2014), at http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/ofﬁcial_texts_112964.htm.
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Also included in the Wales Summit Declaration was a political commitment to spend at least
20 percent of defense spending on major new equipment and/or the research and development of such equipment:
Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related
Research & Development, will continue to do so. . . . Allies who currently spend less than 20% of
their annual defence spending on major new equipment, including related Research &
Development, will aim, within a decade, to increase their annual investments to 20% or more
of total defence expenditures.5

As of February 2017, only ﬁve NATO countries, including the United States, were meeting
the 2 percent guideline.6 Three more are on track to meet that guideline within a year or two.7
Among the remaining member states, seventeen have recently begun to increase their defense
spending.8 Thus, a growing number of NATO member states appear to be in a position to
meet the 2 percent guideline before the 2024 deadline agreed to in Wales.
As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump described NATO as “obsolete,”9 and complained
that the United States pays “a totally disproportionate share of NATO.”10 A few days later, he
told a crowd at a rally that other NATO member states were “ripping off the United States.”11
He concluded that “[e]ither they have to pay up for past deﬁciencies or they have to get out.”12
Since his inauguration, President Trump and other administration ofﬁcials have continued
to raise the defense spending issue. On February 15, 2017, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis
addressed the commitments of the United States and other NATO members:
I register the concern in European capitals about America’s commitment to NATO and the security of Europe. I also understand our long-term European allies and friends are seeking reassurance
and clarity about American intentions. I join you today representing America’s commitment and
President Trump’s “strong support” for our Alliance.

5

Id.
Those ﬁve countries are Estonia, Greece, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. North Atlantic
Treaty Org. Press Release, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2009–2016), PR/CP(2017)045 (Mar. 13,
2017), available at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_ﬂ2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_170313pr2017-045.pdf [hereinafter Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries]. These ﬁgures are based on calculations
made by NATO. Id. This press release acknowledges that, because of disputes over the deﬁnition of defense spending, see infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text, the numbers published by NATO may diverge from those published by national authorities. See also White House Press Release, Joint News Conference at NATO
Headquarters, Mike Pence, Vice President of the United States, and Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary
General (Feb. 20, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/02/20/remarks-vice-presidentand-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-jpa [hereinafter February Joint News Conference].
7
February Joint News Conference, supra note 6.
8
Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries, supra note 6.
9
See, e.g., “This Week” Transcript: Donald Trump and Sen. Bernie Sanders, ABC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2016), at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-donald-trump-sen-bernie-sanders/story?id=37949498 (“I think
NATO’s obsolete. NATO was done at a time you had the Soviet Union, which was obviously larger, much larger
than Russia is today. I’m not saying Russia’s not a threat. But we have other threats. We have the threat of terrorism
and NATO doesn’t discuss terrorism, NATO’s not meant for terrorism. NATO doesn’t have the right countries in
it for terrorism.”).
10
Id.
11
Ashley Parker, Donald Trump Says NATO is ‘Obsolete,’ UN is ‘Political Game,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2016), at
https://www.nytimes.com/politics/ﬁrst-draft/2016/04/02/donald-trump-tells-crowd-hed-be-ﬁne-if-nato-brokeup.
12
Id.
6

758

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Vol. 111:3

A decade ago, when I was serving as Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, I watched
then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warn members of this Council that Congress and the
American body politic would lose their patience for carrying a disproportionate burden of the
defense of Allies. . . .
The impatience Secretary Gates predicted is now a governmental reality. As noted by a European
Minister of Defense, calling for two percent defense spending is a “fair” demand from the
American people to their long-time Allies and friends in Europe. No longer can the American
taxpayer carry a disproportionate share of the defense of western values. Americans cannot care
more for your children’s future security than you do. Disregard for military readiness demonstrates a lack of respect for ourselves, for the Alliance, and for the freedoms we inherited,
which are now clearly threatened.
...
I owe it to you to give you clarity on the political reality in the United States, and to state the fair
demand from my country’s people in concrete terms. America will meet its responsibilities, but if
your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to this Alliance, each of your
capitals needs to show support for our common defense.
Speciﬁcally, we must ensure we are not in the same spot at the end of the year that we are in today.
We must adopt a plan this year, including milestone dates, to make steady progress toward meeting Warsaw and Wales commitments.
If your nation meets the two percent target, we need your help to get other allies there. If you have
a plan to get there, our Alliance is counting on you to accelerate your efforts and show bottom-line
results. And if you do not yet have a plan, it is important to establish one soon. Showing immediate and steady progress to honor commitments made at Warsaw and Wales must become a reality if we are to sustain a credible Alliance and adequately defend ourselves.
. . . NATO will remain strong only if all nations show their respect for NATO’s beneﬁts and carry
a full and equal burden of our defense. There is no substitute for our security—and we can afford
peace and survival as free nations.13

Vice President Mike Pence echoed Mattis’s key points in a speech and press conference in
Europe later that same month.14 On February 20, 2017, NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg also emphasized the importance of burden-sharing:
At the same time, I fully support what has been underlined by President Trump and by Vice
President Pence today, the importance of burden-sharing. And I think we have to remember
that this is not only something that the U.S. is asking for, it’s actually something that 28 Allies
agreed. The leaders from 28 NATO-allied countries sat around the same table in 2014 and agreed
to stop the cuts, to gradually increase defense spending, and then to meet the 2 percent target
within a decade. And the good news is that we are moving in the right direction. After many
years of decline, after many years of defense cuts across Europe and Canada, we saw that in
2015 we stopped the cuts, the ﬁrst year after we made the pledge. And then, in 2016, we had
13
Jim Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Intervention by Secretary of Defense Mattis, Session One of the North
Atlantic Council (Feb. 15, 2017), at https://nato.usmission.gov/february-15-2017-intervention-secretarydefense-mattis-session-one-north-atlantic-council; Dan Lamothe & Michael Birnbaum, Defense Secretary
Mattis Issues New Ultimatum to NATO Allies on Defense Spending, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017), at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/15/mattis-trumps-defense-secretary-issues-ultimatumto-nato-allies-on-defense-spending; Helene Cooper, Defense Secretary Mattis Tells NATO Allies to Spend More, or
Else, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/world/europe/jim-mattis-natotrump.html.
14
Mike Pence, Vice President of the United States, Munich Security Conference (Feb. 18, 2017), available at
https://nl.usembassy.gov/remarks-vice-president-pence-munich-security-conference-february-18; February Joint
News Conference, supra note 6.
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a signiﬁcant increase of 3.8 percent in real terms, or $10 billion. There is a long way to go, and
much remains to be done, but at least we have turned a corner and we have started to move in the
right direction. I am encouraged by that, and I expect all allies to make good on the promise that
they made in 2014 to increase defense spending and to make sure to have a fairer burdensharing.15

Neither Mattis nor Pence elaborated on what Mattis had in mind when he said that the
United States may “moderate its commitment[s]” if other NATO member states failed to
meet the 2 percent guideline.16 As a candidate, President Trump hinted at the possibility
that the United States might refuse to fulﬁll its collective-defense obligations in the event
of an attack against a “massive nation[]” with “tremendous wealth” that hadn’t been spending
adequately on defense.17 These collective-defense obligations are codiﬁed in Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty, which provides:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.18

Another possibility would be to withdraw troops from—or stop deploying new troops to—
countries that are not meeting the 2 percent guideline. Addressing this possibility, the senior
NATO commander based in the United States said: “If the U.S. forces would stop deploying,
it would be some kind of strategic shock in Europe.”19 The United States might also withdraw some of its equipment based in Germany, which hosts the largest contingent of U.S.
military personnel in Europe.20 Since the U.S. military relies on its military personnel and
bases in Germany for operations beyond the scope of NATO,21 however, independent strategic considerations may weigh against such a withdrawal.
15

February Joint News Conference, supra note 6.
Mattis, supra note 13.
17
Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html (On June 21,
2016, Donald Trump said “If we cannot be properly reimbursed for the tremendous cost of our military protecting
other countries, and in many cases the countries I’m talking about are extremely rich. . . . I would prefer that we be
able to continue, but if we are not going to be reasonably reimbursed for the tremendous cost of protecting these
massive nations with tremendous wealth. . . . We’re talking about countries that are doing very well. Then yes, I
would be absolutely prepared to tell those countries, ‘Congratulations, you will be defending yourself.’”); see also
Steven Erlanger, As Trump Era Arrives, A Sense of Uncertainty Grips the World, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2017), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/world/europe/trump-eu-nato-merkel-brexit-russia-germany-china.html.
18
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, Art. 5.
19
Michael Birnbaum, A Top NATO General Echoes Trump, Calling Aspects of the Alliance ‘Obsolete,’ WASH. POST
(Jan. 17, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/top-nato-general-aspects-of-alliance-are-obsoleteechoing-trump/2017/01/17/9a91eff0-dcd8-11e6-8902-610fe486791c_story.html; see also Michael Birnbaum,
Even as Trump Seeks Warmer Ties with Russia, U.S. Deploys Troops Across Eastern Europe, WASH. POST (Jan. 30,
2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-troops-begin-long-planned-deployment-across-easterneurope-even-as-trump-talks-of-cooperation-with-russia/2017/01/30/e516f508-e6f0-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e0
5d_story.html.
20
Rick Noack, German Defense Ministry Contradicts Trump, Says It Doesn’t Owe U.S. Money for NATO, WASH.
POST (Mar. 19, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/19/german-defenseministry-contradicts-trump-says-it-doesnt-owe-u-s-money-for-nato.
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President Trump’s displeasure with NATO partners resurfaced again in March. Following
a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Trump tweeted: “Germany
owes . . . vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the
powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany!”22 German defense minister
Ursula von der Leyen responded:
There is no debt account in NATO. To relate the 2% defense spending that we want to reach in
the next decade solely to NATO is wrong . . . . The defense spending also goes to UN-peace mission[s], into European missions and towards our contributions to the ﬁght against ISIS
terrorism.23

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has reiterated Germany’s commitment to meeting the
2 percent guideline by 202424 and German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen described
the United States’ demand for more spending as “a fair request” and agreed that “[e]veryone
has to make a contribution.”25 Many German ofﬁcials see the goal as unrealistic, however.26
On March 31, German foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel said
The idea that Germany in a few years will spend €70 billion each year on the army is an idea that I
consider absurd . . . . It’s particularly absurd if we look at France which spends €40 billion but has
also a nuclear program included in it. I would honestly not even know where to put all the aircraft
carriers we would buy with €70 billion.27

He went on to emphasize the nature of the spending commitment in the Wales
Declaration:
It is important to correctly quote the Wales declaration. Its guidelines say members should lean
towards a 2 percent spending, but it is at no point written that this is a ﬁxed goal and that every
member state should invest 2 percent of its GDP in defense.28

German leaders also endorsed a broad interpretation of the types of expenses that should be
counted for purposes of meeting the 2 percent goal. Defense Minister Leyen emphasized that
German expenditure on UN peacekeeping missions is part of a “modern understanding of
security.”29 German leaders, including Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Gabriel,
have pointed out that if Germany’s €30–40 billion in spending on the Syrian refugee crisis
were included in the NATO security spending calculations, Germany would already be either
22
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 18, 2017, 6:15 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/843088518339612673; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 18,
2017, 6:23 AM), at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/843090516283723776.
23
Euan McKirdy, Germany’s Defense Minister to Trump, No We Don’t Owe NATO Money, CNN (Mar. 20,
2017), at http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/20/politics/nato-commitment-germany-reacts-trump.
24
Noack, supra note 20.
25
Michael Birnbaum, Trump’s Calls for Europe to Increase Defense Spending Could Force Other Upheaval, WASH.
POST (Feb. 15, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/trumps-calls-for-europe-to-increasedefense-spending-could-force-other-upheaval/2017/02/15/fe257b44-efc1-11e6-a100-fdaaf400369a_story.
html.
26
Id.
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David M. Herszenhorn & Giulia Paravicini, Germany Pushes Back on Trump’s NATO Demands, POLITICO
(Mar. 31, 2017, updated Apr. 3, 2017), at http://www.politico.eu/article/germany-pushes-back-on-donaldtrump-nato-demands-angela-merkel.
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at or very close to the 2 percent guideline.30 Italian Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano has
made a similar point about Italian spending on search-and-rescue operations for migrants
in the Mediterranean.31 In addition, European ofﬁcials have suggested that foreign development aid—an area where the EU’s spending exceeds that of the United States32—might
properly be understood as part of security spending. At the Munich Security Conference
in February, Chancellor Merkel said:
When we help people in their home countries to live a better life and thereby prevent crises, this is
also a contribution to security . . . . So I will not be drawn into a debate about who is more militaryminded and who is less.33

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has also endorsed a broader understanding of European contributions to stability and security.34
At a press conference on April 12, 2017, President Trump suggested that his views on
NATO may have evolved. Most signiﬁcantly, he explicitly abandoned his earlier characterization of NATO as obsolete. At a joint press conference with Stoltenberg, Trump declared: “I
said it was obsolete; it’s no longer obsolete.”35 Trump also took a softer tone but retained his
focus on spending, saying:
In facing our common challenges, we must also ensure that NATO members meet their ﬁnancial
obligations and pay what they owe. Many have not been doing that. The Secretary General and I
agree that other member nations must satisfy their responsibility to contribute 2 percent of GDP
to defense. If other countries make their fair share, instead of relying on the United States to make
up the difference, we will all be much more secure and our partnership will be made that much
stronger.36

On May 25, 2017, President Trump attended a NATO summit and personally met with
other foreign leaders. His remarks again focused on spending:
The NATO of the future must include a great focus on terrorism and immigration, as well as
threats from Russia and on NATO’s eastern and southern borders. These grave security concerns
are the same reason that I have been very, very direct with Secretary Stoltenberg and members of
the Alliance in saying that NATO members must ﬁnally contribute their fair share and meet their
30
Lorne Cook, U.S. Gives NATO Allies 2 Months for Defense Spending Plans, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 31,
2017), at https://apnews.com/ce256f31a023483b8ed5d246abd49290; Robin Emmott, Europe Dodges Trump’s
Defense Spending Ultimatum, REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2017), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-natoanalysis-idUSKBN1601IF; Amanda Erickson, No, Germany Doesn’t Owe America ‘Vast Sums’ of Money for
NATO, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/18/
no-germany-doesnt-owe-america-vast-sums-of-money-for-nato.
31
Herszenhorn & Paravicini, supra note 27.
32
Emmott, supra note 30.
33
Erickson, supra note 30.
34
Emmott, supra note 30 (“Things look very different if we add up our defense budgets, our development aid
budgets and our humanitarian efforts all around the world. . . . We want . . . a broader understanding that the word
‘stability’ in the world means defense expenditure, human aid and development aid.”).
35
White House Press Release, Joint Press Conference at White House, Donald Trump, President of the United
States, and Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, (Apr. 12, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-ofﬁce/2017/04/12/joint-press-conference-president-trump-and-nato-secretary-general [hereinafter April
Joint Press Conference]. Trump’s comments linked his changed view to NATO’s efforts to combat terrorism.
Immediately before describing his changed opinion, Trump said: “The Secretary General and I had a productive
discussion about what more NATO can do in the ﬁght against terrorism. I complained about that a long time ago
and they made a change, and now they do ﬁght terrorism.” Id.
36
April Joint Press Conference, supra note 35.
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ﬁnancial obligations, for 23 of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be
paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for their defense.
This is not fair to the people and taxpayers of the United States. And many of these nations owe
massive amounts of money from past years and not paying in those past years. Over the last eight
years, the United States spent more on defense than all other NATO countries combined. If all
NATO members had spent just 2 percent of their GDP on defense last year, we would have had
another $119 billion for our collective defense and for the ﬁnancing of additional NATO reserves.
We should recognize that with these chronic underpayments and growing threats, even 2 percent
of GDP is insufﬁcient to close the gaps in modernizing, readiness, and the size of forces. We have
to make up for the many years lost. Two percent is the bare minimum for confronting today’s very
real and very vicious threats. If NATO countries made their full and complete contributions, then
NATO would be even stronger than it is today, especially from the threat of terrorism.37

An omission in Trump’s speech garnered signiﬁcant attention: at no point did he reafﬁrm the
United States’ obligations under Article 5. According to press reports, that afﬁrmation was
deleted shortly before Trump spoke, though it is unclear by whom.38 More recently, Vice
President Mike Pence speciﬁcally reafﬁrmed the United States’ commitment to Article 5, saying:
We will meet our obligations to our people to provide for the collective defense of all our allies.
The United States is resolved, as we were at NATO’s founding and in every hour since, to live by
that principle that an attack on one of us is an attack on us all.39

On June 9, 2017, at a joint press conference with the Romanian president, President Trump
ﬁnally reafﬁrmed the U.S. commitment to NATO’s collective defense obligation when he
said, in response to a question from a journalist:
Well, I’m committing the . . . United States to Article 5. And certainly we are there to protect. And
that’s one of the reasons that I want people to make sure we have a very, very strong force by paying
the kind of money necessary to have that force. But, yes, absolutely, I’d be committed to Article
5.40

Separately, the U.S. Senate and President Trump have evinced their continued support for
the Alliance by approving Montenegro’s membership in NATO.41 Pursuant to the North
Atlantic Treaty, the members of NATO may, by a unanimous decision, invite “any other
European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to
37

White House Press Release, Donald Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump at NATO
Unveiling of the Article 5 and Berlin Wall Memorials (May 25, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-ofﬁce/2017/05/25/remarks-president-trump-nato-unveiling-article-5-and-berlin-wall.
38
Susan Glasser, Trump National Security Team Blindsided by NATO Speech, POLITICO (June 5, 2017), at http://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/05/trump-nato-speech-national-security-team-215227.
39
White House Press Release, Remarks by the Vice President to the Atlantic Council (June 5, 2017), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/06/05/remarks-vice-president-atlantic-council.
40
White House Press Release, Joint Press Conference at White House, Donald Trump, President of the United
States, and Klaus Iohannis, President of Romania, (June 9, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressofﬁce/2017/06/09/remarks-president-trump-and-president-iohannis-romania-joint-press.
41
Andrew Hanna, Senate Votes Overwhelmingly to Admit Montenegro to NATO, POLITICO (Mar. 28, 2017), at
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/senate-approves-montenegro-nato-treaty-236606; White House Press
Release, Statement By the Press Secretary on Montenegro’s NATO Accession Protocol (Apr. 11, 2017), at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/04/11/statement-press-secretary-montenegros-nato-accessionprotocol [hereinafter Statement on Montenegro].
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the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to th[e] [t]reaty . . .” and thereby become a
member of NATO.42
Montenegro began the process to join NATO eight years ago, in 2009, when it joined the
Membership Action Plan, NATO’s program of advice and assistance to prepare countries to
join NATO.43 Throughout the process, Russia has ﬁrmly and vocally opposed to NATO’s
expansion in the Balkans.44 The current NATO members extended such a formal membership invitation to Montenegro on May 19, 2016, by signing an accession protocol.45
When President Harry Truman initially submitted the North Atlantic Treaty to the U.S.
Senate for its advice and consent in 1949, he committed to seeking the such advice and consent again for the addition of any new members of NATO.46 Accordingly, on June 28, 2016,
then-President Barack Obama and then-Secretary of State Kerry submitted the accession protocol to the Senate for its approval.47 On March 28, 2017, the Senate approved Montenegro’s
accession by a vote of 97–2.48
Following the Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senate included
the following declaration in its resolution approving Montenegro’s accession:
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following declarations: . . .
(6) Support for 2014 wales summit defense spending benchmark. The Senate declares that all
NATO members should continue to move towards the guideline outlined in the 2014 Wales
Summit Declaration to spend a minimum of 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) on defense and 20 percent of their defense budgets on major equipment, including
research and development, by 2024.49

Several Republican senators likewise emphasized defense spending in their individual statements surrounding the vote on Montenegro.50
President Trump signed the U.S. instrument of ratiﬁcation of the accession protocol on
April 11—the day before Trump announced his change of view regarding NATO’s
42

North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, Art. 10.
North Atlantic Treaty Org., Relations with Montenegro (last updated June 12, 2017), at http://www.nato.int/
cps/cs/natohq/topics_49736.htm; North Atlantic Treaty Org., Membership Action Plan (last updated June 12,
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Foreign Relations dated June 6, 1949, recommending advice and consent to ratiﬁcation of the North Atlantic
Treaty: “Inasmuch as the admission of new members might radically alter our obligations under the pact, the
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obsolescence.51 Montenegro became NATO’s twenty-ninth member state on June 5, 2017,
at a ceremony that took place at the U.S. State Department.52

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
President Trump Issues Executive Orders Suspending Refugee Program and Barring Entry by
Individuals from Speciﬁed Countries
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.55
On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that: (1) prohibited
nationals from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the United States for ninety
days; and (2) prohibited individuals from entering into the United States as refugees for 120
days. Courts stayed the order on constitutional and statutory grounds. In response to these
stays, President Trump replaced the initial order with a new order that eliminated preferential
treatment for refugees ﬂeeing from religious persecution and narrowed the scope of persons
prohibited from entering into the United States. Courts again issued stays, holding that the
new order violated the Establishment Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The
Trump administration appealed, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in October.
Along with its grant of certiorari, the Court kept the lower court stays in place except as to
people with no connection to the United States either personally or through family.
During the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump campaigned on a platform of
revamping the process and substance of U.S. policy regarding immigrant and nonimmigrant
visas. The particulars of his proposals evolved over time. In December 2015, Trump’s campaign website called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United
States . . . until our country’s representatives can ﬁgure out what is going on.”1 This proposal
remained on the campaign website until February 2017. Trump frequently discussed these
views on the air and during stump speeches. During an interview with CNN in March 2016,
Trump said that “Islam hates [America],”2 and suggested that the United States should not
“allow people coming into the country who have this hatred of the United States.”3 On Fox
News, shortly after a terrorist attack in Brussels, Trump expressed his view that the country
was “having problems with the Muslims.”4 These “problems,” according to Trump, justiﬁed
implementation of a more rigorous vetting process for entry into the United States:
51
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The time is overdue to develop a new screening test for the threats we face today. In addition to
screening out all members or sympathizers of terrorist groups, we must also screen out any who
have hostile attitudes towards our country or its principles—or who believe that Sharia law should
supplant American law.5

As the campaign continued, Trump began to suggest that his revision of U.S. policy on
immigration and refugee admissions would focus on speciﬁc geographic areas. In response
to Republican criticism of his previous call for barring Muslims from entering the country,
Trump said: we “call it territories. OK? We’re gonna do territories.”6 Trump’s later commentary suggested that the new focus on geographical territories expanded the breadth of his initial
proposal to prohibit Muslims from entering the country:
I actually don’t think [focusing on territories instead of religion is] a rollback. In fact, you could say
it’s an expansion. I’m looking now at territories. People were so upset when I used the word
Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim. Remember this. And I’m okay with that, because
I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.7

Trump further elaborated on his proposal during one of the presidential debates, when he
explained that “[t]he Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into an
extreme vetting from certain areas of the world.”8
One week after his inauguration in January 2017, President Trump exercised his power
pursuant to Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to issue an executive order implementing his “extreme vetting” proposal. Section 212(f) provides:
Whenever the President ﬁnds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United
States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for
such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate.9

The order, which took immediate effect, contained three key provisions that banned immigrants and nonimmigrants from certain countries from entering the United for ninety days,10
suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days,11 and imposed a variety of
reporting and vetting requirements.12
Section 1 of the executive order noted that “the visa-issuance process plays a crucial role in
detecting individuals with terrorist ties and stopping them from entering the United
States.”13 The text continues:
5

Daniel White, Read Donald Trump’s Ohio Speech on Immigration and Terrorism, TIME (Aug. 15, 2016), at
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Meet the Press – July 24, 2016, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2016), at http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/
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8
Full Transcript: Second 2016 Presidential Debate, POLITICO (Oct. 10, 2016), at http://www.politico.com/story/
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In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those admitted to this country
do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles. The United States cannot, and
should not, admit those who do not support the Constitution, or those who would place violent
ideologies over American law. In addition, the United States should not admit those who engage
in acts of bigotry or hatred (including “honor” killings, other forms of violence against women, or
the persecution of those who practice religions different from their own) or those who would
oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation.14

Section 3 prohibited certain immigrants and nonimmigrants from entering the United
States for ninety days. The order described the prohibition as a temporary pause to allow
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Director of National Intelligence, to “immediately conduct a review to determine the information needed from any country to adjudicate any visa, admission, or other beneﬁt under the
INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual seeking the beneﬁt is who the
individual claims to be and is not a security or public-safety threat.”15 To “temporarily reduce
investigative burdens on relevant agencies” during the pendency of this review, the order suspended “entry into the United States” for “immigrants and nonimmigrants”—excluding
“foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas,
C-2 visas for travel to the United Nations, and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 visas”—from
seven countries: Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen.16 The order also authorized the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to waive the suspension “on a case-bycase basis, and when in the national interest,” and to “issue visas or other immigration beneﬁts
to nationals of countries for which visas and beneﬁts are otherwise blocked.”17 President
Trump issued the temporary ban based on his determination that continued access to the
United States for citizens of these countries “would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States.”18
Section 5 of the executive order related to the United States Refugee Admissions Program.
The order immediately “suspend[ed] the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120
days,” during which time the president ordered that
the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall review the USRAP application and adjudication process to determine what additional procedures should be taken to ensure that those
approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United
States, and shall implement such additional procedures.19

The order provided that 120 days after the date of the order, “the Secretary of State shall
resume USRAP admissions only for nationals of countries for which the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have jointly
determined that such additional procedures are adequate to ensure the security and welfare of
the United States.”20
14
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Section 5 also provided that once the refugee program re-opened, it would be administration policy to: prioritize admission of refugees who were subject to religious persecution, but
only if they belonged to a minority religion within the country of origin;21 prohibit Syrian
nationals from entering as refugees until “such time as [the president] determine[s] that sufﬁcient changes have been made to the USRAP to ensure that admission of Syrian refugees is
consistent with the national interest”;22 and cap the total number of refugees allowed per year
at 50,000.23 As with Section 3, the order created a waiver process:
[T]he Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to
the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as they
determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in the national interest—including
when the person is a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution,
when admitting the person would enable the United States to conform its conduct to a preexisting
international agreement, or when the person is already in transit and denying admission would
cause undue hardship—and it would not pose a risk to the security or welfare of the United
States.24

During the announcement of the new executive order, Trump observed: “This is the
‘Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.’ We all
know what that means.”25 The next day, Rudy Giuliani—a former advisor to President
Trump—gave the media some additional information regarding Trump’s proposal: “I’ll
tell you the whole history of it. So when [the president] ﬁrst announced it, he said
‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me the right
way to do it legally.’”26 Giuliani advised Trump to “focus[] on, instead of religion, danger—
the areas of the world that create danger for us.”27
Within days, both individual and state plaintiffs ﬁled lawsuits to challenge the executive
order.28 Chief among their arguments was a claim that the order violated the Establishment
Clause. The plaintiffs relied on statements made by Trump—over the course of his candidacy
and during his time in ofﬁce—to argue that the government “intended to disfavor Islam and
favor Christianity.”29 They observed that Section 3 suspended entry into the United States
from seven majority-Muslim countries, and that Sections 5(b) and 5(e) operated in conjunction
to permit entry by Christian refugees but not Muslim refugees.30 Section 5(b) provides:
21
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video.foxnews.com/v/5301869519001/?#sp=show-clips.
27
Id.
28
See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC, Complaint, at 150–52 (D.
Md. Feb. 7, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-MD-0004-0001.pdf [hereinafter IRAP Complaint]; Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR, Complaint, at 48–52 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
30, 2017), available at https://www.pacermonitor.com/view/M6A6GYA/State_of_Washington_v_Trump_et_
al__wawdce-17-00141__0001.0.pdf [hereinafter Washington Complaint]; Sarsour v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv00120, Complaint, at 67–73 (E.D. Va. Jan 30, 2017), available at https://www.cair.com/images/press_
releases/Complaint-1.30.2017FOR-FILING.pdf.
29
Washington Complaint, supra note 28, at para. 50.
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See supra note 28.
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Upon the resumption of USRAP admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent permitted
by law, to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution,
provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of
nationality.31

Section 5(e), for its part, authorized the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to grant
admission to refugees from the seven majority-Muslim countries notwithstanding Section 3
“so long as they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in the national
interest—including when the person is a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution . . . .”32 Plaintiffs argued that these provisions effectuated President
Trump’s “intent to enact policies that exclude Muslims from entering the United States and
favor Christians seeking to enter the United States”33 by “discriminat[ing] between ‘minority
religions’ and majority religions, [and by] explicitly granting ofﬁcial preference to foreign
adherents of minority faiths in the refugee-application process.”34
Some litigants raised procedural due process challenges,35 citing reports that enforcement
agencies were denying entry even to lawful permanent residents.36 Litigants argued that
barring lawful permanent residents from reentering the United States violated the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by taking away rights without sufﬁcient notice or
opportunity to be heard.37 On February 1, White House legal counsel—after acknowledging
“reasonable uncertainty” concerning the scope of the Order—clariﬁed that the Order did
not “apply to lawful permanent residents of the United States.”38 This clariﬁcation came
after then DHS Secretary John Kelly announced:
In applying the provisions of the president’s executive order, I hereby deem the entry of lawful
permanent residents to be in the national interest. Accordingly, absent the receipt of signiﬁcant
derogatory information indicating a serious threat to public safety and welfare, lawful permanent
resident status will be a dispositive factor in our case-by-case determinations.39

Other plaintiffs argued that the order violated the Equal Protection Clause.40 Like the
Establishment Clause claims, these arguments relied in part on “statements made by
31

82 Fed. Reg. at 8979.
Id.
33
IRAP Complaint, supra note 28, at para. 38.
34
Id., para. 152.
35
E.g., Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, Complaint, at 57–62 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017), available at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁeld_document/1-_complaint.pdf; Loughalam v. Trump, No. 17-cv10154, Complaint, at 40–43 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Loughalam Complaint]. See generally
University of Michigan Law School, Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, Civil Rights Challenges to Trump
Refugee/Visa Order (2017), at https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=44.
36
See Dan Merica, How Trump’s Travel Ban Affects Green Card Holders and Dual Citizens, CNN (Jan. 29, 2017), at
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban-green-card-dual-citizens/index.html.
37
See Washington Complaint, supra note 28.
38
Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, Memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State, the Acting
Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security (Feb. 1, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.
net/chDocs/resources/new_DonaldFMcGahnIICounseltothePresident_1485982416.pdf.
39
Dep’t of Homeland Security Press Release, Statement by Secretary John Kelly on the Entry of Lawful
Permanent Residents into the United States (Jan. 29, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/resources/778_DHSSecretaryJohnKelly_1485981132.pdf.
40
E.g., Washington Complaint, supra note 28, at paras. 41–47; Loughalam Complaint, supra note 29, at paras.
46–52.
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[Donald Trump] concerning [the] intent and application” of the Order.41 These litigants
asserted that the Order “target[ed] individuals for discriminatory treatment based on their
country of origin and/or religion, without lawful justiﬁcation.”42
Some challenges to the order relied on statutory claims.43 Title 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) provides that “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the
issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or
place of residence.”44 Plaintiffs making this argument suggested that the mandate to “suspend
entry into the United States” for ninety days should be construed, in effect, as a suspension of
the “issuance of visas” under § 1152(a)(1).45 These plaintiffs then alleged that the executive
order violated this provision by singling out nationals of seven countries for disfavored
treatment.46
Finally, some challengers argued that the executive order violated international law.47 The
United Nations Convention Against Torture—which the United States ratiﬁed in 199448—
prohibits states parties from involuntarily returning “a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”49
In a ﬁling in the Western District of Washington, one group of plaintiffs argued that:
The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note, implements
the United Nations Convention Against Torture, which the United States ratiﬁed in 1994.
Pub. L. 105–277, div. G, subdiv. B, title XXII, § 2242. Under the Convention Against
Torture, the United States may not involuntarily return any person to a country where there
are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture
. . . . As implemented, the executive order suspends all immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into
Washington by individuals from seven countries and forecloses their ability to apply for relief
under the Convention Against Torture.50

These plaintiffs did not include this claim in their second amended complaint.51
Most discussion of the executive order’s international law ramiﬁcations has appeared in
amicus briefs ﬁled in the various cases.52 In addition to raising Convention Against

41

Washington Complaint, supra note 28, at para. 43.
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Azad v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00706, Complaint, at 69–70 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2017), available at https://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-CA-0084-0001.pdf; Aziz v. Trump, No.1:17-cv-116, Complaint, at
43–44 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-VA-0004-0003.
pdf.
44
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) (2012).
45
Exec. Order No. 13,769, supra note 10, at 8977.
46
E.g., Washington Complaint, supra note 28, at paras. 58–61.
47
E.g., id. paras. 66–69.
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See generally MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32276, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS (Jan. 21, 2009).
49
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art. 3,
Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 20-100 (1988), 1465 UNTS 85, available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf.
50
Washington Complaint, supra note 28, at paras. 67–68.
51
Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR, Second Amended Complaint (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16,
2017), at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-WA-0029-0107.pdf.
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See infra notes 53–56.
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Torture claims, amici have argued that the executive order might violate the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR). Speciﬁcally, one group of amici claimed:
The substantive rights guaranteed by the CCPR, which must be protected without discrimination
based on religion or national origin under article 2, include the protection of the family. Article 23
provides in relevant part: “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.” The [Human Rights Council] has interpreted this
right to include living together, which in turn obligates the state to adopt appropriate measures “to
ensure the unity or reuniﬁcation of families, particularly when their members are separated for
political, economic or similar reasons.”
Restrictions on travel and entry caused by the EO that impose disparate and unreasonable burdens
on the exercise of this right violate CCPR article 2 . . . . [T]he CCPR’s nondiscrimination principles and protections for family life should be considered by courts in interpreting government
measures affecting family uniﬁcation. This treaty-based protection for family life is consistent with
Supreme Court jurisprudence respecting the role of due process of law in governmental decisions
affecting family unity.53

According to this brief, the executive order threatened to violate these principles of public
international law by preventing persons with family members in the United States from
being reunited.54
Other amicus arguments have suggested that the executive order violated the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination:
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(“CERD”) also bars discrimination based on national origin. The United States has been a
party to the CERD since 1994. Under article 2, paragraph (1)(a), each state party commits to
refraining from and prohibiting all forms of racial discrimination, and each further undertakes
“to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination . . . and to ensure that all public authorities
and public institutions, national or local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.” CERD
deﬁnes “racial discrimination” to include distinctions and restrictions based on national origin.
With regard to immigration practices, CERD makes clear that states are free to adopt only
such “nationality, citizenship or naturalization” policies that “do not discriminate against any particular nationality.” Like the nondiscrimination provisions of CCPR article 26, CERD article 2
does not limit its application to citizens or resident noncitizens . . . . Article 4 of CERD further
provides that state parties “[s]hall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination,” which (as noted) includes discrimination based
on national origin. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the body of
independent experts appointed to monitor CERD’s implementation, interprets article 4 to
require states to combat speech stigmatizing or stereotyping noncitizens generally, immigrants,
refugees, and asylum seekers, with statements by high-ranking ofﬁcials causing “particular
concern.”55
53
Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-15589, Brief of International Law Scholars and Nongovernmental Organizations
as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, at 8–9 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/
datastore/general/2017/04/20/17-15589%20International%20Law%20Scholars%20Amicus.pdf (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter International Law Amici].
54
See also Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-15589, 2017 WL 1457828, Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Equality,
the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, and the National Queer Asian Paciﬁc Islander
Alliance, at 23–24 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2017) (arguing that “the public has a strong interest in maintaining personal
and familial relationships for persons within the United States and those seeking to immigrate to the United
States”).
55
International Law Amici, supra note 53, at 11–12 (internal citations omitted).
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The amici urged the court to consider “[t]he legality of the EO in this case, and the proper
interpretation of the statutes and constitutional provisions cited by the parties” with the international law “proscriptions in mind.”56
In response to these suits, some district courts began issuing temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions—relying on a mix of statutory and constitutional grounds—that
prevented enforcement agencies from detaining and deporting individuals during the pendency of the litigation.57 The temporary restraining order in Washington v. Trump, in the
Western District of Washington, was notable for its nationwide scope.58 Although the district
court did not specify which of the plaintiff’s claims were likely to succeed, the court enjoined
enforcement of “Section 3(c) . . ., Section 5(a) . . . [and] Section 5(b) of the Executive Order”;
“proceeding with any action that prioritizes the refugee claims of certain religious minorities”;
and enforcement of “Section 5(c) . . . [and] Section 5(e) of the Executive Order to the extent
Section 5(e) purports to prioritize refugee claims of certain religious minorities.”59
The temporary restraining order in Washington v. Trump was upheld on appeal. In a per
curiam decision, the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he Government has not shown that the
Executive Order provides what due process requires, such as notice and a hearing prior to
restricting an individual’s ability to travel.”60 For that reason, the court “conclude[d] that
the Government has failed to establish that it will likely succeed on its due process argument
in this appeal.”61 Addressing the Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Establishment Clause
claims, the court said:
The States’ claims raise serious allegations and present signiﬁcant constitutional questions. In light
of the sensitive interests involved, the pace of the current emergency proceedings, and our conclusion that the Government has not met its burden of showing likelihood of success on appeal on
its arguments with respect to the due process claim, we reserve consideration of these claims until
the merits of this appeal have been fully briefed.62

The anticipated consideration of these claims never took place, because on March 6—twentysix days after the Ninth Circuit’s decision—President Trump rescinded his initial executive
order and issued a second one.63
The introduction to this second executive order explained that it was issued to address
“judicial concerns” about the ﬁrst order as well as to “clarif[y] or reﬁne[] the approach” of
the ﬁrst.64 Like the ﬁrst order, the second order imposed a “temporary pause on the entry
of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, subject to categorical
56

Id. at 13; see also Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 553799, Amicus Brief of the Fred
T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality in Support of Appellees, at 6 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2017).
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E.g., Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17–cv–116 (LMB/TCB), 2017 WL 580855, at **11 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017)
(preliminary injunction); Vayeghan v. Kelly, No. CV 17-0702, 2017 WL 396531, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2017)
(temporary restraining order); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2017) (temporary restraining order).
58
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
59
Id. at *2.
60
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017).
61
Id. at 1167.
62
Id. at 1168.
63
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017), available at https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-03-09/pdf/2017-04837.pdf.
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Id. at 13212.
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exceptions and case-by-case waivers.”65 The new order also retained the ﬁrst order’s data collection requirements.66
The second order differed from the ﬁrst order in several important respects. First, the new
order did not include Iraq on the list of banned countries. Second, the new order was prospective, applying only to persons who “are outside the United States on the effective date of
this order . . . did not have a valid visa at 5:00 p.m., eastern standard time on January 27, 2017
. . . and do not have a valid visa on the effective date of this order”67 and excluding lawful
permanent residents entirely.68 Third, the new order eliminated preferential treatment on the
basis of religious persecution. Fourth, the new order did not categorically bar Syrians from
entering the United States as refugees. Finally, the new order contained a speciﬁc section discussing how the executive branch would process and resolve waiver requests under Section
2(c)’s ninety-day visa issuance suspension.69 The new order authorized “a consular ofﬁcer, or,
as appropriate, the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or the
Commissioner’s delegee” to decide whether to grant a waiver70—a power that the ﬁrst
order had vested in the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security. The new order also listed
nearly a dozen circumstances where “[c]ase-by-case waivers could be appropriate.”71
Former White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer explained that, although the text had been
changed, “the principles of the executive order remain[ed] the same.”72 President Trump, in addition to stating that the new order imposed “EXTREME VETTING,”73 also called it a “watered
down, politically correct” version of the “ﬁrst Travel Ban,”74 noting at a rally that “[t]his is a
watered-down version of the ﬁrst one. And let me tell you something. I think we ought to go
back to the ﬁrst one and go all the way, which is what I wanted to do in the ﬁrst place.”75
The plaintiffs challenging the ﬁrst order amended their complaints to update their constitutional and statutory arguments in light of the second order.76 A district court in Maryland
65
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Id. at 13214–15. The circumstances speciﬁed include, for example, instances where “the foreign national
seeks to enter the United States to visit or reside with a close family member (e.g., a spouse, child, or parent)
who is a United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, or alien lawfully admitted on a valid nonimmigrant
visa, and the denial of entry during the suspension period would cause undue hardship”; instances where “the
foreign national is an infant, a young child or adoptee, an individual needing urgent medical care, or someone
whose entry is otherwise justiﬁed by the special circumstances of the case”; and instances where “the foreign
national has been employed by, or on behalf of, the United States Government (or is an eligible dependent of
such an employee) and the employee can document that he or she has provided faithful and valuable service to
the United States Government.”
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White House Press Brieﬁng, Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Sean Spicer (Mar. 6, 2017), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/03/06/press-gaggle-press-secretary-sean-spicer.
73
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:44 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/871679061847879682?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw.
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Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 3:29 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/871675245043888128.
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Laura Jarrett, Trump Admin to Appeal Travel Ban Rulings ‘Soon,’ CNN POLITICS, at 2:45 (Mar. 16, 2017), at
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/15/politics/travel-ban-blocked/index.html.
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issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on March 16 on the grounds that the plaintiffs
had established a likelihood of success “on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim.”77
The district court reasoned that, despite the changes between the ﬁrst and second order,
[T]he history of public statements continues to provide a convincing case that the purpose of the
Second Executive Order remains the realization of the long-envisioned Muslim ban. The Trump
Administration acknowledged that the core substance of the First Executive Order remained
intact. Prior to its issuance, on February 16, 2017, Stephen Miller, Senior Policy Advisor to
the President, described the forthcoming changes as “mostly minor technical differences,” and
stated that the “basic policies are still going to be in effect.”78

The district court reached the constitutional question only after ﬁnding, regarding the alternative statutory claim, that the plaintiffs had failed to show “a likelihood of success on the merits of
the claim that § 1152(a) prevents the President from barring entry to the United States pursuant
to § 1182(f), or the issuance of non-immigrant visas, on the basis of nationality.”79 On May 25,
the Fourth Circuit—sitting en banc—upheld the district court’s preliminary injunction.80 The
court held in an 11–3 decision that the plaintiffs had “more than plausibly alleged that [the
second order’s] stated national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for its
religious purpose.”81 After “look[ing] behind” the second order, the Court concluded:
EO-2 cannot be divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it. In
light of this, we ﬁnd that the reasonable observer would likely conclude that EO-2’s primary purpose is to exclude persons from the United States on the basis of their religious beliefs. We therefore ﬁnd that EO-2 likely fails Lemon’s purpose prong in violation of the Establishment Clause.82

The court did not reach the statutory question “[b]ecause the district court enjoined Section 2(c)
[of the second order] in its entirety based solely on Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim . . . .”83
The next month, the Ninth Circuit upheld a similar nationwide temporary restraining
order issued by a district court in Hawai’i. In that case, the district court temporarily prohibited enforcement of the second order on the grounds that plaintiffs had demonstrated “a
strong likelihood of success on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim.”84 The
Ninth Circuit afﬁrmed the temporary restraining order on different grounds,85 avoiding
the constitutional question entirely and ﬁnding instead that President Trump exceeded the
statutory authority vested in him by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
The Ninth Circuit began by scrutinizing whether the president properly exercised his
power under Section 212(f) of the INA,86 which authorizes the president to suspend the
No. 1:17-cv-00050, Second Amended Complaint (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-HI-0004-0010.pdf.
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entry of certain aliens provided he ﬁnds that admitting those aliens would be detrimental to
the United States.87 The court interpreted the statute to require as a “precondition” that the
president “make sufﬁcient ﬁndings” justifying a “conclusion that entry of all nationals from
the six designated countries, all refugees, and refugees in excess of 50,000 would be harmful to
the national interest.”88 After reviewing the text of the order, the court held that “[t]here [was]
no sufﬁcient ﬁnding in EO2 that the entry of the excluded classes would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States.”89 Next, the court found that, because § 1152(a)’s nondiscrimination provision “cabins the President’s authority under [Section 212(f)],”90 the executive
order violated the INA by “suspending the issuance of immigrant visas and denying entry
based on nationality.”91
The Trump administration ﬁled petitions for certiorari in both cases and requested a stay of
the preliminary injunction in Maryland and the temporary restraining order in Hawai’i. On
June 26, the Court agreed to hear the case and—in a per curiam opinion—allowed the March
6 executive order to take partial effect.92 Under the Court’s decision, the second order may be
enforced only against nationals of the six enumerated countries “who lack any bona ﬁde relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”93 The Court elaborated on what constitutes a bona ﬁde relationship:
For individuals, a close familial relationship is required. A foreign national who wishes to enter the
United States to live with or visit a family member, like Doe’s wife or Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law,
clearly has such a relationship. As for entities, the relationship must be formal, documented, and
formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading EO–2. The students from
the designated countries who have been admitted to the University of Hawaii have such a relationship with an American entity. So too would a worker who accepted an offer of employment
from an American company or a lecturer invited to address an American audience. Not so someone who enters into a relationship simply to avoid §2(c): For example, a nonproﬁt group devoted
to immigration issues may not contact foreign nationals from the designated countries, add them
to client lists, and then secure their entry by claiming injury from their exclusion.94

Two days after the Supreme Court’s ruling, the State Department issued a cable to embassies
and consulates around the world, updating the scope of the order in light of the “bona ﬁde relationship” requirement.95 The cable stated—consistent with the Court’s ruling—that the
order’s “suspension of entry does not apply” to “[a]ny applicant who has a credible claim of
a bona ﬁde relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”96 For individuals, the
order would not apply to those with a “close familial relationship” to a person in the United
87
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States.97 Importantly, the State Department deﬁned “close family” as a “parent (including parent-in-law), spouse, child, adult son or daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, sibling, whether
whole or half.”98 But “‘[c]lose family does not include grandparents, grandchildren, aunts,
uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, brothers-laws and sisters-in-law, ﬁancés, and any other
‘extended’ family members.”99 For entities, the State Department clariﬁed that:
A relationship with a “U.S. entity” must be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary
course rather than for the purpose of evading the E.O. A consular ofﬁcer should not issue a
visa unless the ofﬁcer is satisﬁed that the applicant’s relationship complies with these requirements
and was not formed for the purpose of evading the E.O.100

The State of Hawai’i—the lead plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit’s Hawai’i v. Trump case—
ﬁled an emergency motion in federal district court seeking to clarify the scope of the preliminary injunction in light of the Supreme Court’s June 26 decision and the State Department’s
updated interpretation of the executive order.101 Hawai’i argued that the government’s new
interpretation violated the Supreme Court’s prohibition against enforcing the ban with
respect to persons having “bona ﬁde” connections to the United States.102 According to
Hawai’i, the Supreme Court’s “bona ﬁde relationship” guidance could not be interpreted
to exclude “ﬁancés, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts,
uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States.”103 Initially, the district
court refused to clarify the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision:
[T]he parties’ disagreements derive neither from this Court’s temporary restraining order, this
Court’s preliminary injunction, nor this Court’s amended preliminary injunction, but from
the modiﬁcations to this Court’s injunction ordered by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the clariﬁcation to the modiﬁcations that the parties seek should be more appropriately sought in the
Supreme Court.104

The Ninth Circuit afﬁrmed the district court’s order refusing to “clarify” the Supreme Court’s
decision, but noted that the district court “possess[ed] the ability to interpret and enforce the
Supreme Court’s order.”105
Hawai’i then ﬁled a new emergency motion to “enforce” or “modify”—rather than “clarify”—the preliminary injunction.106 The district court partially granted the plaintiff’s
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC, Emergency Motion to Clarify Scope of Preliminary
Injunction (D. Haw. June 29, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-HI-00040127.pdf.
102
Id. at 3–4.
103
Id. at 3.
104
Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC, Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to
Clarify Scope of Preliminary Injunction, at 2 (D. Haw. July 6, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.
net/chDocs/public/IM-HI-0004-0131.pdf.
105
Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-16366, Order, at 3 (9th Cir. July 7, 2017), available at https://www.clearing
house.net/chDocs/public/IM-HI-0004-0133.pdf.
106
Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-16366, Motion to Enforce or, in the Alternative, to Modify Preliminary
Injunction (D. Haw. July 7, 2017), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-HI-00040134.pdf.
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request.107 First, the district court ruled that “the Government’s narrowly deﬁned list ﬁnds no
support in the careful language of the Supreme Court or even in the immigration statutes on
which the Government relies.”108 The district court modiﬁed the injunction to prohibit the
government from enforcing the exclusionary provisions of the executive order against: refugees with “a formal assurance from an agency within the United States that the agency will
provide, or ensure the provision of, reception and placement services to that refugee”;109 refugees “in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program through the Lautenberg Program”;110 and
persons with “grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles,
nieces, nephews, [or] cousins . . . in the United States.”111 The district court denied the plaintiff’s request to expand the preliminary injunction to cover refugees afﬁliated with certain
refugee admissions organizations.112 The government then appealed the district court’s
modiﬁcation of the injunction to the Supreme Court.113

USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
Trump Administration Maintains Nuclear Deal with Iran, Despite Persistent Skepticism
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.51
Iran, the ﬁve permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the
European Union agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July
2015. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit the scope and content of its nuclear program
in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories.1 Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump denounced the JCPOA. He said
that, if elected, he would “renegotiate with Iran—right after . . . enabl[ing] the immediate
release of our American prisoners and ask[ing] Congress to impose new sanctions that stop
Iran from having the ability to sponsor terrorism around the world.”2 So far, however, the
107

Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-16366, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Enforce, or, in the Alternative to Modify Preliminary Injunction (D. Haw. July 13, 2017), available at https://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-HI-0004-0138.pdf.
108
Id. at 12.
109
Id. at 26.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 20–22.
113
Trump v. Hawai’i, No. 16-1540 (16A1191), Motion for Clariﬁcation of June 26, 2017, Stay Ruling and
Application for Temporary Administrative Stay of Modiﬁed Injunction, (S. Ct. July 14, 2017).
1
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, 55 ILM 98, 108 (2016) [hereinafter JCPOA]. See also
Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 649 (2015);
Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL 789 (2016)
[hereinafter Daugirdas & Mortenson, 110 AJIL].
2
Donald Trump, Donald Trump: Amateur Hour with the Iran Nuclear Deal, USA TODAY (Sept. 8, 2015), at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/09/08/donald-trump-amateur-hour-iran-nuclear-deal-column/
71884090; see also, e.g., Donald Trump, Full text of Donald Trump’s speech to AIPAC (Mar. 21, 2016), available
at http://www.timesoﬁsrael.com/donald-trumps-full-speech-to-aipac (indicating that his “number-one priority is
to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran”).
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Trump administration has kept the agreement in place. The United States has continued to
acknowledge Iran’s compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and has waived various sanctions
against Iran in compliance with its own obligations thereunder.3 Iran, by contrast, has
charged the United States with failing to live up to its own JCPOA commitments.
The Trump administration ﬁrst engaged with the issue after Iran launched a mediumrange ballistic missile test on January 29, 2017, shortly after Trump’s inauguration.4 Iran’s
Defense Minister Hosesin Dehghan stated that the test “did not violate the [JCPOA] or [UN
Security Council] Resolution 2231” and warned that Iran would “not allow foreigners to
interfere in [its] defense affairs.”5 In response, the United States National Security Advisor
stated that the United States was “ofﬁcially putting Iran on notice” for the launch in what
the administration characterized as actions undermining “security, prosperity, and stability.”6
On February 3, 2017, in a formal response to the missile test, the administration issued
new sanctions against Iran. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Ofﬁce of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) sanctioned twenty-ﬁve entities and individuals involved in procuring technology and/or materials to support Iran’s ballistic missile program, as well as for providing
support to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).7 The
OFAC speciﬁcally designated:
•

•

•

3

[S]everal networks and supporters of Iran’s ballistic missile procurement, including a
critical Iranian procurement agent and eight individuals and entities in his Iran- and
China-based network, an Iranian procurement company and its Gulf-based network,
and ﬁve individuals and entities that are part of an Iran-based procurement network
connected to Mabrooka Trading, which was designated on January 17, 2016, pursuant to Executive Order 13382 . . . .
[A] key IRGC-QF-run support network working with Hizballah, including IRGC-QF
ofﬁcial Hasan Deghan Ebrahimi, his associates Muhammad Abd-al-Amir Farhat and
Yahya al-Hajj, and several afﬁliated companies in Lebanon pursuant to Executive
Order 13224 . . . .
Ali Shariﬁ, an individual providing procurement and other services on behalf of the
IRGC-QF, again, pursuant to Executive Order 13224.8

See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
Iran Tested Medium-Range Ballistic Missile: U.S. Ofﬁcial, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2017), at http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-iran-missiles-idUSKBN15E2EZ.
5
Iran Conﬁrms Missile Test, Drawing Tough Response from Trump Aide, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2017), at http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-missiles-idUSKBN15G3ZO.
6
White House Press Release, Statement by the National Security Advisor (Feb. 1, 2017), at https://www.white
house.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/02/01/statement-national-security-advisor.
7
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Supporters of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program
and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (Feb. 3, 2017), at https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/as0004.aspx. Though this was the ﬁrst time the United States imposed sanctions on
Iran post-JCPOA, the United States has previously made clear its position that the JCPOA does not cover obligations relating to sanctions that are unrelated to Iran’s nuclear development program. See Daugirdas & Mortenson,
110 AJIL, supra note 1, at 793.
8
Id. Executive Order 13,382 targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
and supporters of such activity. Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (2005). Executive Order 13,224
targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. Executive Order 13,224, 66 Fed.
Reg. 49,079 (2001).
4
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A senior administration ofﬁcial emphasized the administration’s view that the sanctions
were fully consistent with the JCPOA:
Let me make clear: These steps we have taken today are outside the JCPOA. The JCPOA is limited
to Iran’s nuclear program, and the U.S. continues to implement its commitment under the
JCPOA. Iran’s provocative ballistic missile launches and other destabilizing activities in the region
are a clear threat to region security. This is why we have acted today in designating these 25 individuals and entities.9

The administration further warranted that the February 3, 2017, sanctions did not redesignate any entities that had been previously dropped from the list as a result of the
JCPOA.10 Nor did the sanctions threaten or affect previously negotiated private agreements,
such as an agreement between Boeing and Iran for the sale of eighty aircraft that had been
concluded in late 2016.11
Adopting the Obama administration’s formulation for criticisms of previous ballistic missile launches,12 the Trump administration described the launches as “inconsistent with”
Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Security Council had adopted to help implement the JCPOA. That resolution provides, in relevant part:
Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the
date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a
report conﬁrming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.13

A senior administration ofﬁcial stated: “The January 29th ballistic missile test launch is
inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and underscores the importance
of the continued international action to curtail such activity.”14 The ofﬁcial further went
on to state that “these missile launches now and in the past are in deﬁance of 2231” but
that he did not “recollect an administration ofﬁcial using the term ‘violation’ per se [of resolution 2231]” to characterize the missile launches.15
Iran denounced the new sanctions as “not compatible with America’s commitments and
resolution 2231 of the U.N. Security Council that endorsed the nuclear deal reached between
Iran and six powers.”16 Iran warned that it would retaliate by imposing legal restrictions on
American individuals—but issued no immediate retaliatory sanctions.

9

U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Senior Administration Ofﬁcials on an Announcement from the Treasury
Department on Iran (Feb. 3, 2017) at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/02/267435.htm [hereinafter
February U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release].
10
Id.
11
Id. See also Boeing Press Release, Boeing, Iran Air Announce Agreement for 80 Airplanes (Dec. 11, 2016), at
http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2016-12-11-Boeing-Iran-Air-Announce-Agreement-for-80-Airplanes.
12
Daugirdas & Mortenson, 110 AJIL, supra note 1, at 794.
13
S.C. Res. 2231, Annex B, para. 3 (July 20, 2015).
14
February U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, supra note 9.
15
Id.
16
Iran to Impose Legal Restrictions on Some U.S. Entities, REUTERS – TV (Feb. 3, 2017), at http://www.reuters.
com/article/usa-trump-iran-idUSL5N1FO5ZO.

2017

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

779

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found that Iran has continued to comply
with the JCPOA in its monitoring report released on February 24, 2017.17 Notably—and
following criticism that its previous reports had been insufﬁciently speciﬁc18—the IAEA
for the ﬁrst time published speciﬁc details on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, ﬁnding
that Iran has not exceeded 300kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67 percent U-235 during the relevant time period.19 In response to the report, Acting U.S. Representative to the IAEA
Andrew Schofer reiterated the United States’ position that “Iran must strictly and fully adhere
to all commitments and technical measures for their duration to enable the IAEA to provide
such assurance. . . . [T]he United States will approach questions of JCPOA interpretation,
implementation, and enforcement with great strictness indeed.”20
In a letter from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan on April
18, 2017, the State Department certiﬁed that Iran was in compliance with its obligations
under the plan.21 The letter indicated that the administration remained concerned about
Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and that President Trump “ha[d] directed a National
Security Council-led interagency review of the [JCPOA] that will evaluate whether suspension
of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the JCPOA is vital to the national security interests of
the United States.”22 Secretary of State Tillerson criticized the JCPOA in a press brieﬁng the
next day, saying that it “fails to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran; it only delays their
goal of becoming a nuclear state.”23 Secretary Tillerson further noted that “[t]he Trump
Administration has no intention of passing the buck to a future administration on Iran”
and thus, the administration was “conducting a comprehensive review of [its] Iran policy.”24
In response, Iran’s envoy to the IAEA stated that the “US can only talk about strictness if
and only if it fully complies with all its obligations under the JCPOA.”25 During the Obama
administration, Iran had also complained that the United States was defying the spirit and the
letter of the agreement.26 This time, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif took to Twitter
accusing the United States of failing to fulﬁll its commitments under the JCPOA.27 In response
to Secretary Tillerson’s letter to Congress, Minister Zarif highlighted the U.S. commitments to
“make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their
17
IAEA Director General, Veriﬁcation and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (Feb. 24, 2017), at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ﬁles/
gov2017-10.pdf [hereinafter IAEA February Report].
18
Trump Administration Pledges ‘Great Strictness’ on Iran Nuclear Deal, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2017), at http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-idUSKBN16E2GZ.
19
IAEA February Report, supra note 17, at 4.
20
U.S. Statement as Delivered by Chargé d’Affaires a.i. Andrew J. Schofer, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting
(Mar. 7, 2017), available at https://vienna.usmission.gov/u-s-statement-iran.
21
Letter from Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Apr. 18, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/270315.htm.
22
Id.
23
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson Press Availability (Apr. 19, 2017), at
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/270341.htm.
24
Id.
25
All Parties to JCPOA Must Fulﬁll Commitments, Says Iran’s IAEA Envoy, PRESS TV (Mar. 8, 2017), at http://
www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/03/08/513531/Iran-IAEA-Najaﬁ-JCPOA-nuclear-deal-US-Amano.
26
Daugirdas & Mortenson, 110 AJIL, supra note 1, at 791.
27
U.S. Deﬁes Both Letter, Spirit of Nuclear Deal: Iran FM, PRESS TV (Apr. 21, 2017), at http://www.presstv.ir/
Detail/2017/04/21/518916/Iran-US-Mohammad-Javad-Zarif-JCPOA-Twitter.
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public statements”28 and to “refrain from any policy speciﬁcally intended to directly and
adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran . . . .”29
On May 17, 2017, despite its criticisms of the agreement, the Trump administration
waived sanctions against Iran as required under the JCPOA.30 At the same time, the administration imposed new sanctions against several Iranian individuals and four organizations,
including a China-based network, for human rights violations.31 OFAC designated the
“Ruan Runling Network,” including one Chinese national and several Chinese ﬁrms, for providing, or attempting to provide, ﬁnancial, material, technological, or other support to Iran’s
Shiraz Electronic Industries.32 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Near Eastern Affairs
Ambassador Stuart Jones explained:
As we continue to closely scrutinize Iran’s commitment to the JCPOA and develop a comprehensive Iran policy, we will continue to hold Iran accountable for its human rights abuses with new
actions. We urge our partners around the world to join us in calling out individuals and entities
who violate international sanctions targeting Iran’s human rights abuses.
Whether it’s imprisoning people arbitrarily, inﬂicting physical abuse and torture, or executing
juvenile offenders, the Iranian regime has for decades committed egregious human rights violations against its own people and foreign nationals, and this pattern of behavior must come to an
end. The U.S. and its partners will continue to apply pressure on Iran to protect the human rights
and fundamental freedoms for everyone in Iran. This includes the U.S. citizens wrongfully
detained or missing in Iran, and we call on Iran to immediately return them to their families.
In addition to the actions taken today, we are communicating to the U.S. Congress that the
United States continues to waive sanctions as required to continue implementing U.S. sanctions-lifting commitments in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This ongoing review
does not diminish the United States’ resolve to continue countering Iran’s destabilizing activity
in the region, whether it be supporting the Assad regime, backing terrorist organizations like
Hezbollah, or supporting violent militias that undermine governments in Iraq and Yemen.
And above all, the United States will never allow the regime in Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.33

Iran and China criticized these new sanctions. On May 18, 2017, Iranian Foreign Ministry
spokesman Bahram Qassemi stated that Iran “condemns the US government’s malintent in
its attempts to reduce the positive effects of the implementation of that country’s commitments under the JCPOA by adding natural and legal individuals to the list of its transnational,
unilateral and illegal sanctions.”34 In further response, Iran added nine U.S. individuals and
28

JCPOA, supra note 1, para. 28. According to the JCPOA, government ofﬁcials for the United States means
senior ofﬁcials of the U.S. Administration. Id., para. 28, n.1.
29
Id., para. 29.
30
U.S. State Dep’t Press Release, U.S. State Department Issues Report on Human Rights Sanctions on Iran
(May 17, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/05/270925.htm. Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs Ambassador Stuart Jones stated the following with regards to the report: “[W]e are communicating to the U.S. Congress that the United States continues to waive sanctions as required to continue
implementing U.S. sanctions-lifting commitments in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.”
31
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Iranian Defense Ofﬁcials and a China-Based
Network for Supporting Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program (May 17, 2017), at https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/sm0088.aspx.
32
Id. In September 2008, pursuant to Executive Order 13,382, OFAC had designated Shiraz Electronics
Industries for being owned or controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Id.
33
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, U.S. State Department Issues Report on Human Rights Sanctions on Iran
(May 17, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/05/270925.htm.
34
Iran Condemns Fresh US Sanctions over Missile Program, PRESS TV (May 18, 2017), at http://www.presstv.
com/DetailFr/2017/05/18/522318/Iran-US-sanction-missile-nuclear.
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corporations to its sanctions list, citing their “conﬁrmed role in blatant human rights violations.”35 The Foreign Ministry alleged that the banned U.S. ﬁrms and individuals directly
and indirectly cooperated with Israel in its “crimes against humanity in the occupied
Palestinian territories” or in the regime’s “terrorist acts.”36 On May 18, 2017, China lodged
a complaint with the United States due to the sanctions against Chinese ﬁgures.37 Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated “China is opposed to the blind use of
unilateral sanctions particularly when it damages the interests of third parties. I think the
sanctions are unhelpful in enhancing mutual trust and unhelpful for international efforts
on this issue.”38

United States Strikes Syrian Government Airbase in Response to Chemical Weapons Attacks by
Syrian Forces; Two Additional Strikes on Syrian Government Forces Justiﬁed by Defense of
Troops Rationale
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.59
On April 6, 2017, the United States launched air strikes against a Syrian government airﬁeld,1 marking a new development in Syria’s long-running civil war.2 U.S. involvement in the
conﬂict had previously been limited to the provision of indirect support for some rebels and
the use of direct force against certain nonstate actors, particularly Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL).3 This changed in the wake of April 4, however, when a rebel-held town was hit
by a nerve gas attack that killed more than eighty people—including at least thirty children—
and injured hundreds more.4 The attack used Sarin or a Sarin-like substance, which causes
death by asphyxiation, often accompanied by blue facial skin and foaming at the mouth.5 The
United States concluded, along with many other states and the NGO Human Rights Watch,
that the attack was perpetrated by Syria’s Assad regime.6
35

Id.
Id.
37
China Complains to U.S. About New Iran Sanctions, REUTERS (May 18, 2017), at http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-china-idUSKCN18E0UC.
38
Id.
1
Transcript, Trump Speaks about Strikes in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/06/world/middleeast/transcript-video-trump-airstrikes-syria.html.
2
Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL 567
(2016).
3
Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 429
(2015).
4
Anne Barnard & Michael Gordon, Worst Chemical Attack in Years in Syria; U.S. Blames Assad, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/middleeast/syria-gas-attack.html; Syria Chemical
‘Attack’: What We Know, BBC (Apr. 26, 2017), at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39500947. For
discussion of the U.S. response to earlier uses of chemical weapons in the Syrian conﬂict, see Kristina Daugirdas &
Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 108 AJIL 95 (2014).
5
Syria Chemical ‘Attack,’ supra note 4.
6
Human Rights Watch, Death by Chemicals: The Syrian Government’s Widespread and Systematic Use of
Chemical Weapons (May 1, 2017), at https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/01/death-chemicals/syrian-governments-widespread-and-systematic-use-chemical-weapons. See also infra footnote 24 (listing statements supporting
U.S. strike).
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In response, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered a strike on Shayrat Airﬁeld, which the
Syrian government allegedly used to launch the nerve gas attacks.7 The resulting attack,
which used Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) launched from U.S. naval destroyers
in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea,8 marked the ﬁrst time the United States had used force
directly against the Assad regime.9 Not long after the attack on Shayrat Airﬁeld, the
United States launched two additional strikes on Syrian government forces, in each case citing
the existence of relevant deconﬂiction and de-escalation agreements as well as the Americanled coalition’s right to self-defense.
For domestic legal justiﬁcation of the strike on Shayrat Airﬁeld, the administration relied
on the president’s constitutional authority. Trump’s initial announcement did not discuss
legal justiﬁcations,10 but in a subsequent letter to Congress, sent “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,”11 he stated: “I acted . . . pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”12 Press Secretary
Sean Spicer’s explanation likewise focused on the president’s constitutional authority:
I think Article 2 of the Constitution is pretty clear that when it’s in the national interest of the
country, the President has the full authority to act. He did that. He and his team spoke extensively
to congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle that night to describe the action that was being
taken forward. So I think we have fully fulﬁlled every obligation. But the power vested in Article 2
is very clear with the President’s ability to act.13

While the U.S. government has previously taken the position that the 2001 Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorizes force against ISIL in Syria,14 the Trump
administration did not make a similar argument for its strike on the Assad regime.15
More detail emerged about the administration's legal theory in press guidance that, according to a reporter, had been provided to spokespeople within the administration:
As Commander in Chief, the President has the power under Article II of the Constitution to use
this sort of military force overseas to defend important U.S. national interests. The United States
has a strong national interest in preserving regional stability, averting a worsening of the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, and deterring the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, especially
in a region rife with international terrorist groups with long-standing interests in obtaining these
7

Id.
U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Cpt. Jeff Davis on U.S. Strike in
Syria (Apr. 6, 2017), at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1144598/
statement-from-pentagon-spokesman-capt-jeff-davis-on-us-strike-in-syria [hereinafter Cpt. Jeff Davis
Statement].
9
Jeremy Herb, How Trump’s Syria Airstrike Is Similar to — and Different from—Obama’s, CNN (Apr. 7, 2017),
at http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/politics/obama-syria-airstrikes-trump/index.html.
10
See Transcript, Trump Speaks about Strikes in Syria, supra note 1.
11
White House Press Release, A Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Apr. 8, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/
04/08/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore.
12
Id.
13
White House Press Release, Daily Press Brieﬁng by Press Secretary Sean Spicer (Apr. 10, 2017), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/04/10/daily-press-brieﬁng-press-secretary-sean-spicer-35.
14
Caroline D. Krass, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL Vol.
35 (Apr. 1, 2011), at https://www.justice.gov/ﬁle/18376/download. For more on the president’s domestic authority to use force against ISIL, both in its interaction with the War Powers Resolution and otherwise, see Kristina
Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 407, 429 (2015).
15
See Human Rights Watch, Death by Chemicals, supra note 6.
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weapons and using them to attack the United States and its allies and partners. This domestic law
basis is very similar to the authority for the use force in Libya in 2011, as set forth in an April 2011
opinion by the Department of Justice’s Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel. Consistent with the War Powers
Resolution, the President will notify Congress of the use of force. Key congressional leaders
received oral notiﬁcations yesterday evening.16

A senior administration ofﬁcial later elaborated that the United States has a special interest
in regional stability in the Middle East, especially as both Iran and Russia have used the Syrian
conﬂict as a proxy for wider geopolitical struggle.17 The ofﬁcial also noted that U.S. interests
are served by reinforcing the ability to make credible threats and draw meaningful “red
line[s],”18 and that the use of chemical weapons against civilians is intolerable and inherently
against national interests.19 More generally, the press guidance’s reference to the 2011 Ofﬁce
of Legal Counsel memorandum suggested a reliance on that document’s argument that sufﬁciently “limited military operations”—in which the “‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’” of the action falls short of being a “war” for constitutional purposes—may not require
congressional approval.20
As for justiﬁcations under international law, the Trump administration has not supplied an
extensive explanation.21 Under the heading “international,” the April 8 reported press guidance lists a variety of factors that were “carefully considered” by the administration:
– Severe humanitarian distress, including the suffering caused by this and other previous unconscionable chemical weapons attacks by the Syrian military;
– Widespread violations of international law by the Syrian government, in particular
the repeated use of banned chemical weapons against civilians in direct violation of
its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which it acceded to in
2013, as well as UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2118, which was
adopted by the Security Council under its Chapter VII authority, and which
required Syria to cease using chemical weapons and eliminate its chemical weapons
program in its entirety;
– Syria’s contempt for multiple UNSCRs including UNSCR 1540 and those seeking
to give effect to UNSCR 2118, speciﬁcally UNSCRss 2209, 2235, 2314, and 2319;
– The recognition in UNSCRs that the proliferation and use of chemical weapons is a
serious threat to international security and a violation of international law;
16
Marty Lederman, (Apparent) Administration Justiﬁcations for Legality of Strikes against Syria, JUST SECURITY
(Apr. 8, 2017), at https://www.justsecurity.org/39803/apparent-administration-justiﬁcations-legality-strikessyria.
17
White House Press Release, Background Brieﬁng on the U.N. Vote on Syria, and China Relations (Apr. 12,
2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/04/12/background-brieﬁng-un-vote-syria-andchina-relations; Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 2, at 359.
18
White House Press Release, Statement from President Donald J. Trump (Apr. 4, 2017), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/04/04/statement-president-donald-j-trump.
19
White House Press Release, President Trump’s 100 Days of Security and Safety (Apr. 27, 2017), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2017/04/27/president-trumps-100-days-security-and-safety.
20
Krass, supra note 14, at 8–9, 13.
21
See Human Rights Watch, Death by Chemicals, supra note 6; Cpt. Jeff Davis Statement, supra note 8.
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– Syria’s indiscriminate use of such banned weapons to kill and inﬂict other horriﬁc
injuries on civilians in violation of the law of armed conﬂict, which tragically has
been something that Syria has shown little respect for;
– Regional destabilization and international security concerns produced by the
Syrian government’s actions, which include large and growing ﬂows of refugees
and the potential proliferation of chemical weapons;
– Widespread international condemnation of the Syrian government’s conduct,
including its use of chemical weapons;
– A convincing body of reporting that the Syrian Government has committed widespread violations of international law during the conﬂict;
– The exhaustion of all reasonably available peaceful remedies before using force,
including extensive and intensive diplomatic efforts both to end armed conﬂict
in Syria and to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile;
– The U.S. use of force is necessary and proportionate to the aim of deterring and
preventing the future use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government; and
– The U.S. efforts to minimize civilian casualties in the planning and execution of
the strike.22
None of these factors were speciﬁcally framed as a justiﬁcation for the strike as a matter of jus
ad bellum—and indeed, a number of commentators have suggested that the United States’
use of force on April 6 was inconsistent with its obligations under Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter.23
A number of states that addressed the April 6 strikes—including Australia, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—voiced cautious
approval.24 France’s newly elected president, Emmanuel Macron, seemed likewise to signal
22

Lederman, supra note 16.
Ryan Goodman, What Do Top Legal Experts Say About The Syria Strikes, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 7, 2017), at
https://www.justsecurity.org/39712/top-legal-experts-syria-strikes (quoting suggestions by commentators that the
April 6 strikes did not ﬁt within established exceptions to Article 2(4)).
24
Press & Information Ofﬁce of Federal Government of Germany Press Release, Joint Statement by Federal
Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande of France Following the Air Strikes in Syria (Apr. 7, 2017), at https://
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2017/2017-04-07-erklaerung-merkel-hollande_en.html?nn=393794; Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce of the UK Press Release, The United Kingdom
Supports the U.S. Air Strike on the Al Shayrat Airﬁeld Because War Crimes Have Consequences (Apr. 7, 2017), at
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-united-kingdom-supports-the-us-air-strike-on-the-al-shayrat-airﬁeld-because-war-crimes-have-consequences; Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Press Release, A Positive
Response to the Assad Regime’s War Crimes (Apr. 7, 2017), at https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/74644/
cumhurbaskanligi-sozcusu-kalin-esed-rejiminin-savas-suclarina-karsi-verilmis-olumlu-bir-cevap.html; Prime
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet Press Release, Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Apr. 7,
2017), at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/tyoukanpress/201704/7_p.html; Prime Minister of Australia Press Release,
Press Conference with the Minster for Defense and Chief of the Defense Force (Apr. 7, 2017), at https://
www.pm.gov.au/media/2017-04-07/press-conference-minister-defence-and-chief-defence-force; Royal Embassy
of Saudi Arabia Press Release, Kingdom Supports Courageous Decision by U.S. Against Assad Regime (Apr. 7,
2017), at https://www.saudiembassy.net/news/kingdom-supports-courageous-decision-us-against-assad-%E2%
80%8Eregime. See also Madison Park, Who’s with the US on Syria Strikes and Who Isn’t, CNN (Apr. 9, 2017),
at http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/world/syria-us-strike-world-reaction/index.html (quoting ofﬁcial support
from Italy, Jordan, and Spain).
23
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his approval when he said (after the strikes) that “any use of chemical weapons [in Syria]
would result in reprisals.”25 That said, support for the strikes has not been universal: Iran,
Russia, and China criticized the strikes, and Russia called them illegal under international
law.26 Notably, Russia had earlier exercised its veto to prevent Security Council condemnation of the original nerve gas attack.27 According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the Syrian
regime did not use chemical weapons at all on April 4; rather, Syrian regime warplanes
attacked a rebel base which was storing the rebels’ own chemical weapons.28 The Russian
Ministry of Defense has since tweeted: “Syria has no chemical weapons. This fact was documented and conﬁrmed by ofﬁcial representatives of the OPCW.”29
Following the Shayrat Airﬁeld strikes, the United States has used armed force against the
Syrian government on at least two more occasions, in May and June 2017. In a letter to
Senator Bob Corker, the Administration explained that the legal justiﬁcation in each case
—under both domestic and international law—was grounded in the United States’ right
to use force in defense of its own troops and its allies.30
The application of that principle in the May–June strikes appears to emerge in part from an
unreleased July 2015 memorandum of understanding between Russia and the United
States.31 That memorandum established a “deconﬂiction” channel through which the two
countries could coordinate aircraft movements, in order to prevent accidents and inadvertent
escalations.32 By 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense was referring to areas in which the
entrance of Russian or other pro-regime forces would trigger the United States’ opening of the
deconﬂiction channel as “deconﬂiction zone[s].”33 Importantly, the U.S. and Russia disagree
about whether one such deconﬂiction zone exists in the 55-kilometer radius around the
U.S.-led coalition training base at al-Tanf, near the border of Iraq.34 While U.S. Central
25
Michel Rose, Chemical Weapons a Red Line in Syria, France’s Macron Says, REUTERS (May 29, 2017), at http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-france-russia-syria-macron-idUSKBN18P1OH.
26
Michelle Nichols, Russia Blocks U.N. Security Council Condemnation of Syria Attack, REUTERS (Apr. 12,
2017), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-vote-idUSKBN17E2LK.
27
Id.
28
Syrian Aviation Airstrike in Idlib Targeted Chemical Arms Lab—Russian Defense Ministry, RUSSIAN NEWS
AGENCY (Apr. 5, 2017), at http://tass.com/world/939417; Matthew Weaver, Rowena Mason, Martin Chulov
& Emma Graham-Harrison, Putin Stands by Assad as Firm Evidence of Chemical Attack Mounts, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 6, 2017), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/postmortems-conﬁrm-syria-chemicalattack-turkey-says.
29
Russian Ministry of Defense (@mod_russia), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2017), at https://twitter.com/mod_russia/
status/851826675386122240.
30
Letter from Charles Faulkner, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, to Senator Bob Corker (Aug. 2, 2017), at https://
www.lawfareblog.com/white-house-letter-legal-basis-syria-airstrikes.
31
Neil MacFarquhar, U.S. Agrees with Russia on Rules in Syrian Sky, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015) at https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/world/middleeast/us-and-russia-agree-to-regulate-all-ﬂights-over-syria.html.
32
Ministry of Defense of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Russian and US Defense Ministries Signed
Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the Course of Operation in the
Syrian Arab Republic (date not listed), available at http://syria.mil.ru/en/index/syria/news/more.htm?
id=12061345@egNews. See also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the
United States, 111 AJIL 170 (2017), available at doi:10.1017/ajil.2016.5 (describing Memorandum of
Understanding).
33
See, e.g., Carla Babb, Mattis: Pro-Syrian Government Forces in Deconﬂiction Zone Were ‘Iranian-directed,’
VOA NEWS (May 19, 2017), at https://www.voanews.com/a/jim-mattis-pro-syrian-government-forces-deconﬂication-zone-iranian-directed/3862614.html.
34
U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Brieﬁng by Col. Dillon Via Teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq (June 1,
2017), at http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts.
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Command has referred to the al-Tanf surroundings as an “agreed upon”35 and “established
deconﬂiction zone,”36 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has called these claims “unilateral” and “illegitimate.”37
It was on this background that the United States conducted additional strikes on Syrian government forces. On May 18, U.S. aircraft struck a convoy of Syrian regime vehicles that had
entered the disputed al-Tanf deconﬂiction zone.38 According to Secretary of Defense Jim
Mattis, the U.S. strike was necessitated “by offensive movement with offensive capability of
what we believe were Iranian-directed—I don’t know [if] there were Iranians on the ground,
but by Iranian-directed force[s] inside an established and agreed-upon deconﬂiction zone.”39
Secretary Mattis continued: “[W]e’re not increasing our role in the Syrian civil war, but we will
defend our troops . . . [including] a coalition element made up of more than just U.S. troops.”40
The United States struck regime forces again on June 19, this time downing a Syrian warplane. Ofﬁcial explanations again emphasized the Russia-U.S. deconﬂiction zones—perhaps
in relation to the reasonableness of U.S. forces’ perception of hostile intent—without specifying their precise legal relevance. According to the United States, the warplane had demonstrated “hostile intent” by dropping bombs near American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) around the SDF-held town of Ja’Din,41 two kilometers north of “an established EastWest SDF-Syrian Regime de-conﬂiction area.”42 Explaining this third strike, a U.S.
Department of Defense spokesperson said that “the coalition will not tolerate demonstrated
hostile intent and actions of pro-regime forces toward coalition or partner forces in Syria who
are conducting legitimate operations to defeat ISIS.”43

35

Id.
Lisa Ferdinando, Spokesman Reports on Progress in Effort to Defeat ISIS, US CENTRAL COMMAND NEWS (June 1,
2017), at http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1200694/spokesman-reports-on-progress-in-effort-to-defeat-isis.
37
Lavrov: Deconﬂiction Zones Announced without Damascus’ Consent Illegitimate, RT NEWS (June 7, 2017), at
https://www.rt.com/news/391216-lavrov-syria-us-strike.
38
US Aircraft Conduct Strike on Syrian Army Convoy, CBS NEWS (May 18, 2017), at http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/us-aircraft-strike-syrian-regime-forces-al-tanf-base.
39
U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Press Brieﬁng by Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, and Special Envoy
McGurk on the Campaign to Defeat ISIS (May 19, 2017), at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/
Transcript-View/Article/1188225/department-of-defense-press-brieﬁng-by-secretary-mattis-general-dunfordand-sp.
40
U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Remarks by Secretary Mattis and Minister Hultqvist (May 18, 2017), at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1186980/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-andminister-hultqvist-at-the-pentagon.
41
U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Coalition Defends Partner Forces from Syrian Fighter Jet Attack (June 18,
2017), at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2014/0814_iraq/docs/20170618-02-CoalitionDefends
SDFfromSyrianAttack.pdf. This took place twelve days after coalition forces afﬁliated with the United States had
destroyed two artillery pieces and an anti-aircraft weapon when pro-regime forces entered the al-Tanf deconﬂiction
zone. U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Coalition Strikes at Pro-Regime Forces in Syria Deconﬂiction Zone (June
6, 2017), at https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1205056/coalition-strikes-at-pro-regime-forces-in-syriadeconﬂiction-zone.
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Cheryl Pellerin, DoD Ofﬁcial: Sole Focus in Iraq, Syria Remains on Isis, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS
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On August 2, in a response to a request from Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Bob Corker, the Administration offered a more extended explanation of the May
and June strikes:
The United States has sufﬁcient legal authority to prosecute the campaign against al-Qa’ida and
associated forces, including against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This legal authority
includes the 2001 Authorization for the Use Military Force (AUMF) which authorizes the use of
military force against these groups. Accordingly, the Administration is not seeking revisions to the
2001 AUMF or additional authorizations to use force.
The 2001 AUMF also provides authority to use force to defend U.S., Coalition, and partner forces
engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS to the extent such use of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support of counter-ISIS operations. As Secretary Tillerson indicated in his testimony before the Committee on June 13, 2017, our purpose and reason for being in Syria are
unchanged: defeating ISIS. The strikes taken by the United States in May and June 2017 against
the Syrian Government and pro-Syrian-Government forces were limited and lawful measures to
counter immediate threats to U.S. or partner forces engaged in that campaign. The United States
does not seek to ﬁght the Syrian Government or pro-Syrian-Government forces. However, the
United States will not hesitate to use necessary and proportionate force to defend U.S.,
Coalition, or partner forces engaged in the campaign against ISIS.
As a matter of international law, the United States is using force in Syria against al-Qa’ida and
associated forces, including ISIS, and is providing support to Syrian partners ﬁghting ISIS,
such as the Syrian Democratic Forces, in the collective self-defense of Iraq (and other States)
and in U.S. national self-defense. Upon commencing airstrikes against ISIS in Syria in
September 2014, the United States submitted a letter to the U.N. Security Council consistent
with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter explaining the international legal basis for its use of force.
As the letter explained, Iraq has made clear that it faces serious threats of continuing armed attacks
from ISIS, operating from safe havens in Syria; the Syrian Government has shown it cannot, or
will not, confront these safe havens. The Government of Iraq has requested the United States lead
international efforts to strike ISIS sites and strongholds inside Syria to end armed attacks on Iraq,
to protect Iraqi citizens, and to enable Iraq to control its borders. Moreover, ISIS threatens Iraq,
U.S. partners in the region, and the United States. Therefore, consistent with the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense, the United States initiated necessary and proportionate
actions in Syria against ISIS in 2014, and those actions continue to the present day. Such necessary
and proportionate measures include the use of force to defend U.S., Coalition, and U.S.-supported partner forces from threats by Syrian Government and pro-Syrian Government forces.44

United States Alleges Russia Continues to Violate INF Treaty
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.48
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signed by Ronald Reagan
and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, obligates the parties “not to possess, produce, or ﬂight-test a
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or
to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.”1 In 2014, the State Department reported
44

Letter from Charles Faulkner, supra note 30.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987, 1657 UNTS 485, available at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#text [hereinafter INF Treaty]; see also Marian Nash Leich,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 82 AJIL 341(1988).
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that Russia was in violation of its obligation not to possess intermediate- or short-range missiles.2 Russia denied the violation and expressed its own doubts about the United States’ compliance with the INF Treaty; the meetings and discussions that followed did not resolve either
state’s concerns.3 Subsequent State Department reports in 2015 and 2016 continued to
express concern about Russia’s violation.4
In October 2016, two members of Congress wrote a letter to then-President Obama,
observing that “the situation regarding Russia’s violation has worsened and Russia is now
in material breach of the Treaty.”5 They did not publicly elaborate on the nature of the violation, but urged Obama to impose sanctions to respond to it. According to a press report, the
letter was prompted by concerns raised by some U.S. ofﬁcials that “Russia is producing more
missiles than are needed to sustain a ﬂight-test program, spurring fears that the Kremlin is
moving to build a force that could ultimately be deployed.”6 The State Department declined
to comment.7 The Obama administration took the unusual step of calling for a meeting of the
Special Veriﬁcation Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to preside over
compliance issues.8 The commission met in November 2016; publicly, the U.S. State
Department revealed only that “the United States, Belarusian, Kazakh, Russian, and
Ukrainian Delegations met to discuss questions relating to compliance with the obligations
assumed under the Treaty.”9
Shortly after President Donald Trump’s inauguration, press reports indicated that Russia
had completed production and deployed the contested missile system.10 The State
Department spokesperson declined to “comment on intelligence matters,” and said: “We
have made very clear our concerns about Russia’s violation, the risks it poses to European
2
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS 1 (July 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/230108.pdf; Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United
States, 108 AJIL 837 (2014).
3
Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 2, at 840–42.
4
2015 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments, at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2015/243224.htm#INF2; 2016 Report
on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2016/255651.htm#INF%20TREATY (both reports noting that “[t]he United States has determined that [the previous year], the Russian Federation (Russia) continued
to be in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or ﬂight-test a ground-launched
cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such
missiles”).
5
Letter from William M. Thornberry, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services and Devin Nunes, Chairman,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to President Barack Obama, October 17, 2016, available at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedﬁles/20161017_wmt_nunes_to_potus_re_inf.pdf.
6
Michael R. Gordon, Russia is Moving Ahead with Missile Program that Violates Treaty, U.S. Ofﬁcials Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/europe/russia-missiles-inf-treaty.html.
7
Id.
8
INF Treaty, supra note 1, Art. XIII (establishing the Special Veriﬁcation Commission as a forum to “resolve
questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed” and to “agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty”).
9
Thirteenth Session of the Special Veriﬁcation Commission Under the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles (INF Treaty), Nov. 16, 2016, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/11/
264375.htm.
10
Michael R. Gordon, Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14,
2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/europe/russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty.html.

2017

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

789

and Asian security, and our strong interest in returning Russia to compliance with the
treaty.”11 On February 24, in an interview with Reuters, President Trump stated that he
would take up the matter with Vladimir Putin “if and when we meet.”12
On March 8, General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testiﬁed
before the House Armed Services Committee. In his prepared testimony, he stated,
Russia, for example, is not only modernizing its strategic nuclear triad and developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but remains in violation of its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty obligations and has threatened nuclear use against U.S. forces and allies in Europe.13

His oral testimony, however, avoided this reference to a “violation of . . . Treaty obligations,”
instead describing the Russian deployment as “violat[ing] the spirit and intent” of the treaty:
We believe that the Russians have deployed a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and
intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The system itself presents a risk to most of our
facilities in Europe. And we believe that the Russians have deliberately deployed it in order to pose
a threat to NATO and to facilities within the NATO area of responsibility . . . . I don’t have
enough information on their intent to conclude, other than that they do not intend to return
to compliance.14

Selva added that the United States was considering various options to respond to Russia’s
actions, but declined to provide speciﬁcs.15
Responding to the press stories and to Selva’s testimony, Russia denied any violation. On
February 15, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, through a state-run media outlet, had
stated that “[n]obody ofﬁcially accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty. . . . Of course
Russia was and remains committed to its international obligations, including in the framework of the agreement.”16 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also posted a copy
stamped “FAKE” of the New York Times story describing the U.S. allegations17 and issued
another statement calling the accusations “groundless.”18 After Selva’s testimony, Peskov
further stated:
I want to remind you of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s words about the fact that Russia
sticks to the international obligations, even if in situations where sometimes it doesn’t correspond
to Russia’s interests. Russia still remains committed to its obligations, so we disagree and reject any
accusations on this point.19

The Russian Foreign Ministry published an extended response to General Selva’s testimony:
11

Id.
Steve Holland, Trump Wants to Make Sure U.S. Nuclear Arsenal at ‘Top of the Pack,’ REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2017),
at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-exclusive-idUSKBN1622IF.
13
Nuclear Deterrence Assessment, House Armed Services Committee Hearing (Mar. 8, 2017), available at
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t39.d40.03087703.d98?accountid=14667.
14
Id. at 57; see also Michael R. Gordon, Russia Has Deployed Missile Barred by Treaty, US. General Tells Congress,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/us/politics/russia-inf-missile-treaty.html.
15
Nuclear Deterrence Assessment, supra note 13, at 57.
16
Kremlin: Russia Not Ofﬁcially Accused of Violating INF Treaty, SPUTNIK (Feb. 15, 2017), at https://sputnik
news.com/world/201702151050698427-kremlin-peskov-russia-inf.
17
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2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/world/europe/russia-fake-news-media-foreign-ministry-.html.
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Frederik Pleitgen, Alla Eshchenko & Laura Smith-Spark, Russia Denies Deploying Cruise Missiles in Treaty
Breach, CNN (Mar. 9, 2017), at http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/09/europe/russia-us-cruise-missile-treaty.
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We have noted statements made by Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Paul
J. Selva, in which he told the US Congress that Russia had allegedly deployed a land-based cruise
missile that violates the “spirit and intent” of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty.
Such statements are certainly disappointing. As you know, this is not a new story. An informed
person representing the military leadership of a major country should have known better. In particular, he could have ﬁnally explained what exactly they consider our “violations” to be and how
they came to this conclusion.
However, this is not the ﬁrst time that public accusations of Russia’s non-compliance with the
INF Treaty are not backed up by any evidence. They seem to be following what has already
become a familiar pattern—making claims and immediately evading any speciﬁcity.
We have repeatedly afﬁrmed our commitment to the INF. We explained to the US side that all
missile tests in Russia are in compliance with the Treaty. During all negotiations, consultations
and meetings we asked them to list Russia’s speciﬁc actions that are causing concern in
Washington. Invariably, we got little in response except vague proposals to guess what they
meant. This hardly seems like a serious approach.
Indicatively, though, the Americans are threatening to retaliate for Russia’s mythical violations
with certain steps of a military nature. The very fact that US representatives are persistently
using such rhetoric, without bothering to bring any evidence or speciﬁc examples whatsoever,
raises questions about the purpose of these false media narratives.
At the same time, the Americans stubbornly refuse to discuss our well-founded claims concerning
their own compliance with the INF Treaty. I am referring to the Mk-41 vertical launching units in
the Aegis Ashore ground-based anti-missile systems, which the United States has deployed in
Romania and plans to deploy in Poland, and which can reasonably be considered cruise missile
launchers. The large-scale programme of building ballistic missile targets for missile defencerelated applications, with similar characteristics to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,
is also causing a lot of questions. In addition, the United States produces and uses unmanned
combat air vehicles, which ﬁt the deﬁnition of ground-based cruise missiles contained in the
INF Treaty.
Once again, we suggest abandoning this unsubstantiated rhetoric and public accusations without
speciﬁc examples in favour of a substantive dialogue aimed at addressing existing concerns and
clarifying potential points of disagreement. All the mechanisms are there. We are open to such
a dialogue through the appropriate channels.20

For its part, the April 2017 State Department Report, echoing the 2015 and 2016 reports,
continued to describe Russia as violating the INF Treaty:
The United States has determined that in 2016, the Russian Federation (Russia) continued to be
in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or ﬂight-test a groundlaunched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers, or
to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.21

In response, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a lengthy statement on April 29 detailing
what it viewed as U.S. violations of various international obligations:
20

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Brieﬁng by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Maria Zakharov (Mar. 10, 2017), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/
cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2673614.
21
2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments (Apr. 14, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270330.htm.
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The U.S. formally advocates for unconditional implementation of the norms of international law,
which also refers to abiding, to the fullest extent, by international agreements aimed at strengthening international security and maintaining global stability, key among which are arms control,
nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties and conventions.
While proclaiming this approach and setting its own criteria, “ideal” from Washington’s point of
view, in terms of implementation of a particular treaty, the U.S. aspires to a monopoly in assessing
other nations’ compliance with their treaty obligations. Moreover, Washington does so categorically, ignoring the established practice of resolving issues through designated multilateral mechanisms.
The annual report, released by the U.S. Department of State on April 25, 2017, is subject to the
same deﬁciencies as all the previous ones. While making absolutely unsubstantiated accusations
against speciﬁc countries, its authors have once again attempted to portray the U.S. as being all but
the only state with an impeccable track record in terms of compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. Such unacceptable manner of presenting and compiling facts has already become a traditional U.S. way of validating its claims
to the “exceptional right” to judge the “guilty” and demand punishment for them.
While sharing the commitment to full and unconditional compliance with its obligations under
international treaties, the Russian Federation strongly opposes the methods and means used by
Washington in order to supposedly “expose” those countries which, in its opinion, are treaty obligations violators.
For the past years, there has been a growing number of reasons suggesting that such U.S. line of
conduct is not at all due to the fact that it is plainly unwilling to burden itself with a complicated
and time-consuming expert dialogue; it could be something even more serious than that, such as
Washington’s fear of itself being exposed for making unsubstantiated accusations against other
countries, as well as for its own violations of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament
agreements and commitments.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry is once again compelled to draw attention to such unacceptable
activities by the U.S. and to the irrefutable facts aimed at contributing to an unbiased assessment of U.S. and Russia’s actual compliance with their treaty obligations under arms control,
nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments.22
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Comment by the MFA of Russia on the U.S.
Department of State’s Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation,
and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Apr. 29, 2017), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/komm
entarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/2740264.

